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Global Liquidity Provision and Risk Sharing 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We examine liquidity-related characteristics of U.S. firms with cross-listed shares in 20 foreign 
markets in the 1950-2013 period. We find that firms after foreign market listing exhibit lower 
liquidity sensitivity, lower liquidity beta, and suffer less from transitory price shocks. These 
results are stronger when firms are listed on multiple exchanges, in larger and more liquid 
markets. The liquidity enhancement is associated with firms’ increased foreign ownership post-
listing and is effective for firms with high levels of volatility, foreign income, foreign trading, 
and PIN. Our findings provide support for global markets providing liquidity and reducing 
liquidity risk to U.S. firms. 
 
JEL classifications: G11; G14; G15  
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I. Introduction 
During the financial crisis of 2007-2009, many segments of financial markets 
experienced a sharp decline in liquidity. Market illiquidity could result from funding illiquidity 
during market downturns (Khandani and Lo (2007), Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2008), Aragon 
and Strahan (2012), and Ben-David, Franzoni, and Moussawi (2012)).1 For instance, due to a 
sharp market decline, speculators may risk hitting their margin constraints and thus be forced to 
liquidate their assets. Furthermore, tighter risk management by financial intermediaries in 
response to higher volatility reduces their borrowing capability and restricts dealers from 
providing market liquidity (Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) and Nagel (2012)). 
Therefore, funding liquidity, market liquidity, and their interaction are important concerns for 
many investors. However, while the causal impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity in 
U.S. markets has received much scholarly attention, little is known about how funding liquidity 
influences market liquidity in an international context.  
In the international context, the impact of funding liquidity on market liquidity is not 
straightforward (Gromb and Vayanos (2002)). For example, consider a domestic market and a 
foreign market, both of which face funding constraints. On the one hand, after a significant 
negative shock in the foreign market, foreign intermediaries may reach their margin limits in 
their own markets and need to liquidate their holdings in the domestic market as well. In this 
case, international investors act as net liquidity demanders by intensifying the selling pressure in 
the domestic market during the foreign market downturn. On the other hand, international 
investors could also behave as net liquidity suppliers by providing liquidity to the domestic 
market during its downturns.2 
                                                          
1 An asset’s market liquidity is defined as “the ease with which it is traded” and the trader’s funding liquidity means 
“the ease with which traders can obtain funding” (Brunnermeier and Pedersen, 2008, p. 2201). 
2 Garleanu and Pedersen (2011) derive a consumption CAPM augmented by a security’s margin times the general 
funding cost. Their model suggests a considerable funding risk premium for a stock if its margin requirements 
deteriorate during market declines. Furthermore, Brunnermeier and Pedersen’s (2008) theoretical model links the 
market liquidity to funding liquidity by highlighting that the two can mutually reinforce each other and lead to 
liquidity spirals. Overall, the theoretical results of the aforementioned studies call for a better understanding of the 
issue of how market liquidity and funding liquidity risk interact in international settings. 
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The latter scenario is possible through two plausible, yet not mutually exclusive channels: 
ownership dispersion and liquidity provision. During the U.S. market turmoil in the example, 
capital constraints become binding, and U.S. investors may be obliged to liquidate their holdings. 
Meanwhile, as the funding constraints of foreign shareholders remain relatively intact, there is a 
lower liquidation demand from these investors. The dispersed ownership structure helps to 
decrease a firm’s liquidity sensitivity to domestic market downturns. This channel can be 
attributed to the diversified demand for liquidity. In the liquidity provision channel, a lack of 
funding liquidity in the U.S. market can drive asset prices away from their fundamental values. 
Foreign arbitrageurs, unaffected by the aforementioned tightening of U.S. funding constraints, 
may take advantage of arbitrage opportunities by buying U.S. equities. This channel facilitates an 
increase in the supply of liquidity. While there is substantial evidence of commonality in 
liquidity around the world, the aggregate liquidity at a given exchange is only partially driven by 
a global commonality component (Brockman, Chung, and Perignon (2009) and Karolyi, Lee, and 
Van Dijk (2012)).3 Therefore, the equilibrium effect of international markets on liquidity remains 
unclear.  
In order to provide insight on the impact of international funding liquidity on the U.S. 
markets, we examine whether the cross-listing of U.S. companies on foreign exchanges leads to 
improved or degraded liquidity characteristics (e.g., liquidity sensitivity to lagged market returns, 
liquidity betas) for those firms during U.S. market declines. We use a sample of U.S. firms cross-
listed in 20 foreign markets since 1901, with the return and liquidity data covering the 1950 to 
2013 period. This setting provides several advantages. First, a cross-listing event by a U.S. 
company delivers a unique shock to its ownership structure, in which the holdings ratio by 
foreign investors in the firm significantly increases after it is listed on an overseas exchange. 
Second, using cross-listings provides a better understanding of how pools of different investors 
with dissimilar margin constraints across international markets (e.g., Beber and Pagano (2013)) 
                                                          
3 Kamara, Lou, and Sadka (2008) show that, for the cross-section of U.S. stocks, the commonality in liquidity has 
even decreased over time. 
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affect the liquidity of two almost identical (in the time series or cross-section) U.S. firms. The 
only difference between the two firms is that one is traded globally, and the other is not. This 
helps to better isolate the liquidity effects from other possible factors. Third, in our sample 
period, the U.S. firms we examined placed their shares in 20 markets around the world, without a 
clear dominance of any one market.4 This finding enables us to test our main relations in a 
variety of foreign market environments.5 Fourth and last, our focus on the U.S. as a domestic 
market allows us to work with a much longer time period than if we were dealing with other 
markets. Our gain is determined by both the availability of stock return-based data and, more 
importantly, the possibility of using longer and more precise time-series measure of liquidity – 
the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure (see Goyenko, Holden, and Trzcinka (2009)).6 Our rich 
U.S. dataset also allows us to look deeper into the impact of firm characteristics on the 
propensity of international markets to shield liquidity drains.  
Our results are as follows. First, we find that global markets can significantly lower the 
liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms in response to past U.S. market returns. In line with the 
findings of Hameed et al. (2010), the liquidity of U.S. firms listed only at home significantly 
dries up in bear markets, while the negative U.S. market return leads to a considerably smaller 
reduction in liquidity among U.S. firms following the first placement of their stocks abroad. This 
pattern also holds after the inclusion of various firm-level controls, and we obtain similar results 
for two equal sub-periods: 1950-1981 and 1982-2013. Moreover, in poor U.S. market conditions 
as determined by the above-median values of U.S. market volatility, the TED spread, and the 
VIX index, the positive liquidity effect of cross-listings mitigates the reduction in liquidity 
resulting from the domestic market downturn. However, in good market conditions, the cross-
listing has an opposite, but much smaller effect on firm liquidity. This decrease in liquidity 
                                                          
4 Note that certain foreign markets become more attractive for cross-listings during specific time periods (Sarkissian 
and Schill, 2016). 
5  As shown by Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), cross-listings improve price informativeness and, therefore, 
potentially provide stock liquidity only for firms from developed markets.  
6 We also perform our main tests with Corwin and Schultz’s (2012) illiquidity measure, but achieve similar results 
(see the Internet Appendix). 
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sensitivity is not observed in a comparable sample of matched firms without foreign-traded 
shares. We show that cross-listing benefits for firm liquidity are particularly strong when firms 
are listed on multiple stock exchanges, as well as when they list in larger and more liquid 
markets. At the firm level, the additional liquidity provision induced by cross-listings is also 
higher for firms with high return volatility, high foreign income, high probability of informed 
trading (PIN), and high foreign trading volume. 
The decrease in liquidity sensitivity of cross-listed firms to the lagged U.S. market 
returns coincides with the cross-listing event and persists afterwards. These findings are robust to 
a variety of alternative estimations, including using a bid-ask spread as a measure of liquidity 
instead of the Amihud liquidity measure and an extended set of control variables with non-linear 
return terms. Our results are also free from the Heckman’s (1979) sample selection bias. In 
addition, we refute an alternative explanation that the decrease in liquidity sensitivity results 
from an increase in firm size associated with cross-listing, rather than the listing event itself. In 
contrast, we find that negative tendencies in international markets induce very little change in the 
liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms, both cross-listed and traded only on U.S. exchanges. 
Second, using the liquidity CAPM of Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we estimate the 
impact of cross-listings on three liquidity betas of U.S. firms: liquidity sensitivity to the market 
return, market liquidity, and return sensitivity to market liquidity. The results show that the 
liquidity beta based on the sensitivity of firm liquidity to its domestic market return is 
significantly lower after cross-listing on foreign stock exchanges. The average decrease in this 
beta after cross-listing is 0.29. 
Third, we test the two channels through which a cross-listing can reduce a firm’s liquidity 
sensitivity to U.S. market returns. First, to reflect the existence of the ownership dispersion 
channel, we show that, following the listing of U.S. firms on overseas exchanges, the liquidity 
gains among these firms are associated with a 50% increase in ownership by foreign investors. 
Second, in line with the liquidity provision channel, if foreign arbitrageurs buy U.S. equities 
when their valuation deviates from their fundamental values, cross-listed firms would suffer less 
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from transitory price shocks, and experience weaker return reversals than comparable firms 
without foreign presence. In this respect, we expect a greater decrease in temporary price 
deviations for cross-listed firms relative to their respective pre-listing periods, as compared to 
their domestically listed counterparts. Using Nagel’s (2012) liquidity provision framework, we 
find that cross-listed firms indeed suffer less from negative domestic market shocks. The 
reduction in the magnitude of weekly return reversals for these firms is 3.5 times larger than that 
for similar firms without cross-listings. This reduction is particularly strong during recessions, 
which is the most critical time for investors. The reduction in return reversals is also larger for 
firms listed on multiple foreign exchanges, and in markets with high liquidity and market 
capitalization, as well as for firms with high PIN, volatility, and foreign income. 
 Our results underscore the essential role of international markets in supplying liquidity to 
U.S. firms and the U.S. equity market. Liquidity has been widely understood as an important 
determinant of asset returns. For instance, Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Liu (2006), Bekaert, 
Harvey, and Lundblad (2007), and Korajczyk and Sadka (2008) find that liquidity is a priced 
factor. Accordingly, many previous studies focus on the impact of U.S. equity and debt markets 
on the stock market liquidity in foreign countries (Levine and Schmukler (2006), Lee (2011), and 
Goyenko and Sarkissian (2014)). However, there is little research on the other side of the 
relation. Moreover, considering that, even in 2012, foreign-owned U.S. long-term securities 
reached over $13.2 trillion, the effect of international market funding liquidity on U.S. market 
liquidity cannot be neglected. 7  Furthermore, although several studies examine cross-listings 
affect firm liquidity (e.g., Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998), Bailey, Karolyi, and Salva 
(2006), Chung (2006), and Baruch, Karolyi, and Lemmon (2007)), they only analyze changes in 
the liquidity of foreign firms listed in the U.S., without any risk-return implications. By contrast, 
we use the cross-listing universe as a natural setting that delivers unique shocks to firms’ foreign 
ownership structure. In addition, we assume that cross-listing can provide a better understanding 
of liquidity provision and risk sharing in global markets in relative isolation from the influences 
                                                          
7 http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/data-chart-center/tic/Documents/shla2012r.pdf. 
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of other possible cross-country linkages and frictions. Our results show that cross-listing not only 
improves firm liquidity, but also has a positive impact on the firm’s risk structure and return 
dynamics.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we describe cross-listing, 
stock return data, and our liquidity measure. In Section III, we report our main results on the 
effect of cross-listings on liquidity sensitivity and liquidity betas of U.S. firms. In Section IV, we 
analyze the impact of various foreign market and firm characteristics on our results. In Section 
V, we highlight the importance of global stock ownership on the liquidity sensitivity of U.S. 
firms. In Section VI, we estimate the effect of liquidity provision on short-term stock return 
reversals. We draw conclusions in Section VII. The results of an array of robustness tests are in 
the Internet Appendix. 
 
II. Data 
Our study period is from 1950 to 2013. However, the cross-listing sample is from 1901 to 
2012.8 This sample comes from several sources. Most of the data are from the Sarkissian and 
Schill public database, which provides the geography of foreign listings from the 1900s until 
2006.9 These data are supplemented by the listing information from more recent years obtained 
directly from the main stock exchanges around the world, as well as from CRSP. Our sample 
contains only cross-listed U.S. firms with an identifiable permanent number (permno) in CRSP. 
The first identified cross-listing by a U.S. firm was in 1901 by the USX Marathon Group, and it 
was placed on the Amsterdam Stock Exchange in the Netherlands. Our sample includes a total of 
293 firms with 570 cross-listings spanning 20 foreign markets; the stocks of 105 firms are traded 
in more than one foreign exchange. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of the cross-listings of U.S. firms across individual 
                                                          
8 We intentionally made our cross-listing sample shorter by one year than our overall sample. Since we aim to 
examine the liquidity risk sharing effects that arise from the cross-listing, for each listing event, we need at least 
some observations occurring after the listing. Given that our goal is to test what happens after U.S. firms list abroad, 
the stock return and liquidity information in 2013 can be essential for the firms listed in 2012. 
9 See http://sergei-sarkissian.com/data.html.   
7 
 
countries and decades. The largest number of foreign listing placements by U.S. firms was in the 
1980s (180), with almost a third being in Japan (65). This is almost twice the second largest 
number over the 1990s and 2000s. Note that the country representation is more concentrated in 
the earlier part of our sample period. Before 1950 and in the 1960s, U.S. firms were listed only in 
six countries, with 75 listings occurring in Europe and only one in Canada. Yet, in the 2000s, 
U.S. firms were present in 16 foreign markets, with Canada becoming the preferred choice for 
listing. The recent presence of U.S. firms in foreign exchanges is more dispersed across countries 
than even during the 1980s, when they were only in 10 foreign exchanges.   
We obtain U.S. stock return and turnover data from the CRSP daily stock dataset for the 
1950 to 2013 period. We then construct the liquidity measure based on Amihud (2002). The 
Amihud liquidity is based on the price impact and is computed as follows: 
))/(|)|10log(( 6 ttt VolPRCR  , where PRCt is the closing price of the stock, || tR  is the 
absolute value of stock return, and Volt is the trading volume at time t. The liquidity is then 
aggregated at monthly frequency.10 
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and number of observations of stock 
returns, turnover, and liquidity of U.S. firms cross-listed in each foreign market. We consider 
only the market of the first firm cross-listing. The return is the annualized daily holding period 
return including dividends. The turnover is the percentage of the daily trading volume out of the 
total shares outstanding. All variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%. The grand mean return 
across all cross-listed firms is 16% annually. The top five foreign markets with the best U.S. firm 
performance are Brazil, Hong Kong, Austria, Israel, and Canada (median annual return of 28%), 
while the bottom five markets are Sweden, Belgium, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and Germany 
(median annual return of 14%). The average share turnover rate of cross-listed U.S. firms is 
40%, with those traded in Hong Kong and Australia exceeding 100%. Conversely, the firms 
listed in the historically more established overseas exchanges like Austria, Belgium, and the 
Netherlands, along with one firm placed in Brazil, have a turnover of only about 30% or below. 
                                                          
10 The aggregated monthly liquidity series is the average of the (logged) daily measures in each month.  
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Finally, the firms with higher liquidity are cross-listed first in countries such as Belgium, Hong 
Kong, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and, surprisingly, Chile, while less liquid U.S. firms are 
listed in Austria, Brazil, Canada, Israel, and Sweden.11 In line with our expectation, with over 
two million daily observations for all three of our variables (returns, turnover, and liquidity), 
their average number of observations vary greatly across markets. For instance, U.S. firms in the 
Netherlands have the highest number of data entries, while all observations in Brazil come from 
only one firm.  
 
III. Liquidity and Past Returns 
In this section, we develop our empirical methodology and conduct the main tests on the 
impact of cross-listing on two liquidity characteristics of U.S. firms – their liquidity sensitivity to 
past returns and liquidity betas. We also discuss an alternative explanation for our results. 
 
A. Empirical Methodology 
In this section, we investigate the relation between asset liquidity and past returns before 
and after listing abroad. We start by aggregating the daily Amihud liquidity measure for each 
stock to the average monthly Amihud liquidity, LIQi,t. We remove the firm from the sample if 
there are fewer than 15 observations in a month. We then compute the percentage change in 
liquidity, LIQi,t, as follows: (LIQi,t – LIQi,t-1)/|LIQi,t-1|. Since our task is to evaluate the effects of 
lagged market returns on U.S. firm liquidity before and after cross-listing, we introduce a cross-
listing dummy, CLi,t, which equals one if the stock of firm i is listed in a foreign market at time t, 
and zero otherwise.  
Since global financial markets are susceptible to various spillover effects that can impact 
asset liquidity, we also include domestic and foreign market returns — RUS,t and RIN,t, 
respectively — as additional explanatory variables. For the U.S. market return, we use the CRSP 
                                                          
11 The negative sign on the liquidity measure in Brazil is due to a very low trading volume of only one U.S. cross-
listed company in that country.  
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total return index. However, computing the corresponding return in foreign markets is not 
straightforward. Considering that, along with cross-listing in different foreign markets, each firm 
can also place its shares simultaneously in various markets; thus, there is no readily available 
proxy for returns in foreign markets. Furthermore, the set of host markets for U.S. firms can 
change. For example, Apple Inc. listed in Japan in the 1990s, while American Express Inc. listed 
in the United Kingdom in the 1970s; both companies later listed in Germany in 1992 and 1993, 
respectively. Ideally, each U.S. firm i at a particular date t should have its distinct RIN,t based on 
the geography of its cross-listings at that time. Following this logic, and considering the complex 
nature of cross-listing, we construct the foreign market return variable, RIN,t, as follows. Once a 
U.S. firm is cross-listed, the foreign market return is defined as the equally-weighted average of 
the MSCI country index return for all host markets at time t.12 For instance, RIN,t for Apple Inc. is 
the MSCI Japan index return from September 1990 to October 1992. After October 1992, Apple 
Inc.’s RIN,t is the average of the MSCI Japan index return and the MSCI Germany index return. 
In this way, the foreign market return has different values for each firm. 
Our regression framework is a modified version of the framework proposed by Hameed 
et al. (2010). Instead of using individual regressions for each firm, we use panel regressions with 
clustered standard errors.13 The regression model relates the change in assets liquidity, LIQi,t, to 
the aforementioned variables: 
߂ܮܫܳ௜,௧ ൌ ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴ௜.௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴ௎ௌ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴூே,௧ିଵ ൅ ߮ܥܮ௜,௧ ൅ ߛܥܮ௜,௧ ൈ ܴ௎ௌ,௧ିଵ ൅      
															൅ߣܥܮ௜,௧ ൈ ܴூே,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ܯܽݎ݇݁ݐܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ௜,௧ିଵ   .               (1) 
															൅ܨ݅ݎ݉ܨܧ௜ ൅ ߝ௜,௧ 
Coefficients 1 and 2 measure how firm liquidity is affected by its own lagged return and the 
lagged U.S. market return, respectively. In Model (1), we employ cross-market interactions, 
which differs from models used in previous studies. Such effects are captured by the slope 
                                                          
12  Before a U.S. firm is cross-listed, to avoid any drastic change to the foreign market return variable, we define the 
foreign market return as the MSCI country index return of the firm’s first foreign market. 
13 We also run time-series regressions for each firm (see the Internet Appendix).  
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coefficient, 3. A positive3 implies that a contagious spillover effect on U.S. firms arises from 
equity market returns in foreign countries.  
Another important modification from earlier work is that we focus on the changes that 
occur between the pre- and post-cross-listing periods, which are captured by parameters  and 
respectively. A negative implies that, after cross-listing, the U.S. market decline (rise) causes 
a firm’s liquidity to deteriorate (improve) less than in the period before its listing on an overseas 
exchange. Therefore, in the case of U.S. market downturns, international market participants act 
as net liquidity suppliers by providing liquidity to the U.S. market during its own downturns. 
Conversely, a positive suggests that, after cross-listing, a U.S. firm’s liquidity becomes more 
vulnerable to foreign market shocks, and that international investors could act as net liquidity 
demanders by intensifying the selling pressure in the U.S. when foreign markets decline.  
 Model (1) includes two sets of control variables. The first set contains two firm-specific 
characteristics: (1) the lagged changes in firm volatility, i,t-1, and (2) the turnover of its 
shares,STOVi,t-1. Hameed et al. (2010) also use these control variables and they are supported 
by other market microstructure studies (e.g., Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Chordia, Roll, 
and Subrahmanyam (2000)). The second set of control variables includes the same two variables 
estimated at the market level for the U.S. and other countries. These include the lagged changes 
in the aggregate market volatility in the U.S.,US,t-1, and the turnover of its shares,STOVUS,t-1, 
as well as in international market volatility, IN,t-1, and the turnover of its shares,STOVIN,t-1. 
The U.S. market volatility is the monthly standard deviation of the CRSP total market index 
returns. The international market volatility is the standard deviation of monthly foreign market 
returns. The aggregate U.S. market turnover is the equally-weighted share turnover of all firms 
listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. For each U.S. firm i, the aggregate international market 
turnover is the equally-weighted share turnover of all firms with the same host market as that of 
firm i. 
 
B. Impact of Cross-Listing on Firm Liquidity 
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Table 3 reports the panel estimation results for various specifications of Model (1),14 
Panel A reports the results for the overall market conditions. Regressions (1)-(6) report the 
results of the full sample. Regression (1) contains only the first three independent variables in 
Model (1), that is, the lagged firm, the U.S. market, and international market returns, Ri,t-1, RUS,t-1 
and RIN,t-1, respectively. In line with Hameed et al. (2010), we find positive and highly significant 
relations between a firm’s liquidity and both its own return and the domestic market return, 
which implies a liquidity squeeze (enhancement) in poor (favorable) firm or U.S. market 
conditions. However, we find no significant relation between U.S. firm liquidity and foreign 
market returns, which suggests that international markets exert little influence on U.S. firms.  
In Regression (2), we add the cross-listing dummy, CLi,t, and two interaction terms, CLi,t 
× RUS,t-1 and CLi,t × RIN,t-1. The coefficient on CLi,t is insignificant.15 More importantly, we find 
that one of our main coefficients of interest that shows the impact of the CLi,t × RUS,t-1 term on 
firm liquidity, is negative and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that, during negative 
(positive) U.S. market performance, the liquidity of U.S. firms cross-listed in foreign markets 
decreases (increases) less than when those firms are listed only on U.S. exchanges. However, 
another coefficient of interest on the CLi,t × RIN,t-1 term is not significant, implying that negative 
overseas market returns do not diminish a cross-listed U.S. firm’s liquidity. 16  
In Regressions (3)-(4), we include the two firm-level controls: changes in stock volatility 
and turnover, as well as add four market-level control variables: changes in the U.S. and 
international market volatilities and turnover. Consistent with previous findings (Benston and 
                                                          
14 Note that the firm fixed effects for 27 U.S. firms listed overseas before 1950 coincide with their cross-listing 
dummies, and, therefore, for these firms the non-interactive CLi,t terms are dropped in estimations. However, the 
interactive terms, ܥܮ௜,௧ ൈ ܴ௎ௌ,௧ିଵ and ܥܮ௜,௧ ൈ ܴூே,௧ିଵ, are still properly estimated. The exclusion of these pre-1950 
cross-listings does not materially affect our findings. These results are available on request. 
15 An insignificant coefficient on CLi,t is not unexpected. There is mixed evidence of liquidity benefits of cross-
listing, even for listings placed in the United States, which is the most liquid financial market. Some studies find an 
increase in the trading volume and a reduction in bid-ask spreads of cross-listed stocks (e.g., Mittoo, 1997; Foerster 
and Karolyi, 1999, while others find either a decrease in domestic liquidity or no significant effect, which is often 
explained by the partial trading flow migration (e.g., Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan, 1998; Levine and Schmukler, 
2006). Therefore, finding no effect of cross-listing on the level of domestic liquidity of U.S. firms placed abroad is 
consistent with the literature. 
16 In unreported tests (available upon request), we find some limited evidence that, during major foreign crises, the 
spillover of global funding shocks increases to the U.S. firms cross-listed only in the troubled regions. 
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Hagerman (1974), Amihud and Mendelson (1986), and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam 
(2000)), we find that the lagged changes in both firm volatility and individual share turnover are 
significant drivers of a firm’s liquidity. Specifically, both increases in volatility and decreases in 
share turnover appear to reduce firm liquidity. The inclusion of market-level controls further 
demonstrates that only changes in aggregate volatility of the U.S. market have a statistically 
important linkage to firm liquidity. Importantly, the inclusion of all these controls does not 
qualitatively change our conclusions with respect to coefficients on ܥܮ௜,௧ ൈ ܴ௎ௌ,௧ିଵ and CLi,t × 
RIN,t-1. We again see that, after cross-listing, U.S. firms experience a much lower decrease 
(increase) in liquidity during domestic market declines (rises), while it is unaffected when return 
shocks hit international markets. Interestingly, firm-level controls significantly increase the 
overall explanatory power of the regression: the adjusted R-squared increases from 1.5% in 
Regressions (1)-(2) to 22% in Regression (3). The inclusion of market-level controls has hardly 
any effect on the R-squared.  
Hameed et al. (2010) document that liquidity reacts asymmetrically to positive and 
negative lagged returns: the decline in liquidity in response to negative returns is stronger than 
the improvement in liquidity when returns are positive. Therefore, in Regressions (5)-(6), we 
modify Model (1) to do piecewise linear estimations. In Regression (5), we allow firm liquidity 
to react asymmetrically to prior losses and gains. In this specification, Downt-1 is a dummy 
variable that equals one for negative lagged returns, and zero otherwise. We find that the 
coefficient on the interactive term Downt-1×CL×RUS,t-1 is -0.157, statistically significant at the 5% 
level. However, the coefficient on CL×RUS,t-1 is only -0.084. This implies that cross-listings 
provide more liquidity benefits to U.S. firms when their returns are negative. In Regression (6), 
we conduct a separate estimation of liquidity sensitivity for the small and large declines. In this 
specification, DownLt-1 (DownSt-1) equals one if and only if the lagged return is below (above) 
the median of its negative returns.17 Importantly, the coefficient on DownLt-1×CL×RUS,t-1 (-0.175) 
                                                          
17  Regressions (5)-(6) also include the corresponding Down, DownS, and DownL dummies, as well as their 
respective interactive terms with RIN,t-1, but their estimates (all insignificant) are not shown. 
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is 90% greater in magnitude than that on DownSt-1×CL×RUS,t-1 (-0.091). Therefore, we can infer 
that the liquidity provision benefit of cross-listings for U.S. firms is particularly effective when 
stocks incur large losses. 
Finally, Regressions (7) and (8) estimate Model (1) for two sub-periods, 1950 to 1981 
and 1982 to 2013, respectively. The results show that the patterns observed in the overall data 
sample also hold in the two subsamples. Importantly, we find no reduction in the economic or 
statistical significance of the coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1 between the two sub-periods. 
It is also important to compare coefficients 2 and , that is, the slopes on RUS,t-1 and CLi,t 
× RUS,t-1 terms. The F-test results in Table 3 show that the sum of these two coefficients is zero. 
For the full sample, 2 +  is statistically indistinguishable from zero in Regressions (2)-(4), 
implying that the liquidity provision by international markets effectively offsets the reduction in 
firm liquidity due to the declines in U.S. markets. Furthermore, for the 1982 to 2013 sub-period, 
the sum of 2 and  is also statistically zero, indicating that, in more globalized financial markets, 
cross-listed U.S. firms achieve a higher reduction in liquidity risk.  
Next, we re-estimate Model (1) for different levels of U.S. market uncertainty and 
propensity for liquidity dry-outs, which are proxied by three measures: (1) stock market 
volatility, (2) TED spread, and (3) VIX (e.g., Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005)). Due 
to the unavailability of data, the samples for the TED spread and VIX estimations start in 1986. 
We split each characteristic by the median into “low” (below the median) and “high” (above the 
median) subsamples. Columns (1)-(2) in Panel B of Table 3 show the results for the U.S. stock 
market volatility subsamples. We observe that, while the coefficient onCLi,t × RUS,t-1 is negative 
and significant in both columns, it is by more than 50% larger, in absolute terms, for more 
volatile times. The difference in coefficients onCLi,t × RUS,t-1 between the high and low periods 
becomes even more dramatic for the TED spread and the VIX in columns (3)-(4) and (5)-(6), 
respectively. In these tests, the point estimates ofCLi,t × RUS,t-1 are large in magnitude, negative, 
and strongly significant only for the high subsamples. The corresponding point estimates for the 
low subsamples are economically small and insignificant. Therefore, we can conclude that cross-
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listings provide the largest liquidity benefits to U.S. firms when U.S. market conditions are poor, 
precisely when investors need liquidity the most. 
 
C. Cross-Listings and the Matched Sample 
 The results in Table 1 show that more firms became cross-listed over the course of our 
sample period, which coincides with an increased cross-market market openness and 
globalization trends. Therefore, all or most of the liquidity gains that we associate with cross-
listing placements may not be driven by cross-listings per se, but by the general upward trend in 
global market integration that mitigates liquidity constraints among U.S. firms towards the end 
of our sample period. To rule out this possibility, we examine how changes in firm liquidity are 
related to past firm, U.S., and foreign market returns not only for cross-listed firms, but also for 
other comparable U.S. firms that are traded solely in the U.S. To this end, we consider a sample 
of U.S. firms without cross-listings, including only firms with comparable liquidity 
characteristics and similar propensity to list abroad as our cross-listing firm sample. Using the 
methodology proposed by Heckman, Ichimura, and Todd (1997), we construct a matched sample 
based on four firm characteristics: market capitalization, past returns, and two liquidity 
sensitivity measures. The inclusion of market capitalization and past returns is motivated by 
evidence showing that large firms and firms with superior past performance are more likely to 
cross-list abroad (e.g., Pagano, Röell, and Zechner (2002) and Sarkissian and Schill (2009, 
2016)). The two measures of liquidity sensitivity, Liquidity Sensitivity Ri and Liquidity Sensitivity 
RUS, are the estimated coefficients of regressing monthly Amihud liquidity on Ri,t-1 and RUS,t-1, 
respectively. The inclusion of two liquidity measures is to ensure similar liquidity dynamics for 
the cross-listed and matched sample firms before listing (pseudo listing) events.18   
The matched sample is constructed as follows. First, we collect the four firm 
                                                          
18 Despite the attractiveness of the foreign sales of firms, we were unable to use it as another characteristic in 
constructing our matched sample, since these data are sparse: in Compustat, only 11% of entries have non-missing 
foreign sales values. In addition, out of our 8,548 matched firms, a non-missing foreign sale number was available 
for only 2,737 (32%) of the firms. 
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characteristics for cross-listed firms and a pool of non-cross-listed U.S. firms. The non-cross-
listed candidates must be in the same sector (the first digit of the SIC code) as the cross-listed 
firms. For each cross-listed firm i, all four firm characteristics are obtained in the year preceding 
the cross-listing events. 19 For each non-cross-listed firm j, the four characteristics are obtained at 
the end of each year t in the sample period. Then, we compute the normalized Euclidean distance 
between each pair of cross-listed firm i and non-cross-listed firm j in year t based on four 
(demeaned and standardized) firm characteristics: market capitalization, past returns, and two 
liquidity sensitivity measures, Ri and RUS. Finally, for each U.S. firm with a cross-listing, we 
select two control firms with the closest Euclidean distance to that of the cross-listed firm. In 
doing so, we follow Dehejia and Wahba (2002) and conduct matching with replacement—that is, 
we allow one firm to be matched with multiple cross-listed firms during the matching process. 
For each firm in the matched sample, we set its pseudo initial cross-listing date to be the date on 
which the Euclidean distance is the closest to the corresponding cross-listed firm in the year 
preceding its cross-listing event. 
 The summary statistics of firm characteristics for U.S. firms with cross-listings, all U.S. 
firms without cross-listings, and the matched sample of non-cross-listed U.S. firms are in Table 
4. There are 281 cross-listed firms,20 9,725 firms without cross-listings, and 453 matched firms 
without cross-listings. The two-sample t-test results for the inequality of means are economically 
and statistically insignificant all four firm matching characteristics. Therefore, the sample of U.S. 
firms with no cross-listings is successfully matched to the firm sample with cross-listings. 
 Table 5 presents the results based on Model (1) using the samples of cross-listed firms 
(columns (1)-(3)), copied for convenience from Table 3, columns (1)-(2) and (4), respectively, 
the matched sample of non-cross-listed firms (columns (4)-(6)), as well as the difference-in-
difference (DiD) estimations (columns (7)-(8)). The results in columns (1) and (4) show that, 
                                                          
19 Market capitalization is the logarithm of a firm’s total dollar market value of all outstanding common shares at the 
end of the year preceding its cross-listing event. Past return is the annual gross stock return in the year preceding the 
cross-listing event. The liquidity sensitivity measures are based on all observations before the cross-listing event.  
20 In this table, the sample of cross-listed firms includes only cross-listed U.S. firms with valid links between the 
CRSP and Compustat fundamental and supplemental data. 
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over the full sample period, the average impact of RUS,t-1 on liquidity innovations is much larger 
in absolute terms among the matched firms than among the cross-listed ones. These differences 
originate from the firms’ responses to the (pseudo) cross-listing events. Comparing columns (2) 
and (3) to (5) and (6), the coefficients of RUS,t-1 are of similar magnitude, suggesting that the two 
samples respond in a similar manner to shocks in lagged market returns before (pseudo) cross-
listing events. More importantly, the coefficient of CLi,t × RUS,t-1 for the matched sample of firms 
is economically small and statistically insignificant in columns (4)-(6), unlike that for cross-
listed firms in columns (1)-(3). The point estimates of the CLi,t × RUS,t-1 coefficients for cross-
listed firms are more than three times larger in magnitude than those for the matched sample of 
firms (e.g., -0.239 vs. -0.076 for column (3) vs. column (6)). The DiD estimations in columns 
(7)-(8) show that there is a significant decrease in the liquidity sensitivity to lagged market 
returns after cross-listing events for the cross-listed firms, although this effect is not observed for 
the matched firms. We also observe that, irrespective of whether or not a firm has a foreign 
listing, international market returns do not materially influence the liquidity of U.S. firms.   
 Finally, Figure 1 shows the changes in liquidity sensitivity to lagged U.S. market returns 
(coefficient 2 on RUS,t-1) around the cross-listing event for cross-listed firms and pseudo cross-
listings for the matched sample of firms based on specification (1) in Table 5. Due to the high 
volatility of these estimates, each coefficient in year t is the average of estimates over a three-
year window [t-1, t, t+1]. The plot shows that a decline in the liquidity sensitivity of cross-listed 
firms occurs around the listing event and then persists. In contrast, 2 is almost flat for the 
matched firm sample around the pseudo cross-listing event. This result suggests that the parallel 
trend assumption in DiD tests is not violated. Therefore, the results in Table 5 and Figure 1 
provide evidence that cross-listing reduces the liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms to past U.S. 
market returns. 
 
D. Alternative Explanation for Lower Liquidity Sensitivity after Cross-Listing  
In this section, we discuss one alternative explanation for the observed lower liquidity 
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sensitivity in cross-listed U.S. firms – an increase in their firm size. Indeed, it is possible that the 
drop in firm liquidity sensitivity is not due to the cross-listing event per se, but rather emerges 
from the change in firm size over time associated with cross-listing. For instance, firms with an 
increasing market value are more likely to be listed overseas and to experience a decline in 
liquidity risk. 
Our reasons for why this potential explanation can be dismissed are as follows. First, 
while firms have been shown to be the largest and most liquid in their home markets by the time 
of the cross-listing, their size does not increase as a result of listing (Sarkissian and Schill (2009, 
Figure 4; 2012, Figure 1)). Second, Figure 2 provides similar evidence for our sample of cross-
listed firms: their size does not increase after cross-listing. This figure also shows the same series 
for our matched sample of non-cross-listed firms. Note the strong upward trajectory in the size of 
matched firms after pseudo cross-listing throughout the full sample period. However, the results 
in Table 5 (columns (4)-(6)) show no significant effect of pseudo cross-listing on the liquidity of 
matched firms (insignificant coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1). Third, another concern is that the 
upward trajectory of matched firms does not perfectly mimic that of cross-listed firms. To rule 
this out, we construct a placebo sample of non-cross-listed firms that are more closely aligned in 
size to cross-listed firms.21 We plot these series in Figure 2 too. We then repeat regression 
specifications (1), (2), and (4) of Table 3 for the placebo sample and again find an economically 
and statistically insignificant slope on CLi,t × RUS,t-1 (data not shown). Therefore, we conclude 
that our results are not driven by the changes in the size of firms after cross-listing.  
 
                                                          
21 The placebo sample is constructed as follows. From our matched control sample of firms (a sample of U.S. firms 
without cross-listings), we compute the time series of the market capitalization of each firm. Then we select firms 
with a time series pattern similar to that of the cross-listing sample at months -60, 0, and +60 relative to the listing 
month. The selection procedure is as follows. (1) At t = -60, we rank the matched firms by their market cap. Then, 
one firm at a time, we drop the firms with the smallest size until the average market cap gets the closest to the 
average market cap of cross-listed firms at t = -60. (2) At t = +60, we rank the matched firms by market cap. Then, 
one firm at a time, we drop the firms with the largest size until the average market cap gets the closest to the average 
market cap of cross-listed firms at t = +60. (3) At t = 0, we rank the matched firms by market cap. Then, one firm at 
a time, we drop the firms with the smallest size (or the largest firm) until the average market cap gets the closest to 
the average market cap of the cross-listed firms at t = 0. This procedure uses 90% of the matched sample.  
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E. Liquidity Risk 
In this subsection, we examine the sensitivity of liquidity to current market returns and 
other dimensions of liquidity risks, i.e., the commonality in firm liquidity with the market 
liquidity and the return sensitivity to market liquidity. Following the methodology initially 
proposed by Acharya and Pedersen (2005), we consider three liquidity betas: (Liqi, Liqm), 
(Liqi, rm), and (ri, Liqm). For each firm i, we fit the following bivariate model to obtain each 
of the three liquidity betas:  
ݕ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ௜ ൅	ߚ௜ݔ௜,௧ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,					ߝ௜,௧~ܰሺ0, ߪ௜ଶሻ,              (2) 
where (yi, xi) can take the form of (Liqi, Liqm), (Liqi, rm), or (ri, Liqm). Liqi is the 
innovation of firm i’s monthly Amihud liquidity measure obtained from the estimated residuals 
in the univariate AR(2) model, which is adjusted to account for the time trend in liquidity (Pastor 
and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), Watanabe and Watanabe (2008)). The 
adjusted AR(2) model is shown in equation (3): 
	ܯܥ௜,௧ିଵܯܥ௜,ଵ ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵ ቆ
ܯܥ௜,௧ିଵ
ܯܥ௜,ଵ ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ିଵቇ ൅ ߚଶ ቆ
ܯܥ௜,௧ିଵ
ܯܥ௜,ଵ ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ିଶቇ ൅ ߝ௜,௧,          (3) 
where MCi,t-1 is the total market capitalization of firm i at month t-1, and MCi,1 is the 
corresponding value for the initial month Liqm is the innovation of the monthly market 
aggregated Amihud liquidity measure obtained from the estimated residuals in the univariate 
AR(2) model. The market aggregated Amihud liquidity measure is the equally-weighted Amihud 
liquidity measure of all firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. Ri is the monthly excess returns 
of firm i and rm is the CRSP U.S. Total Market Index less the one-month Treasury bill rate. 
Table 6 reports the means and standard deviations of the estimated liquidity betas for 
cross-listed U.S. firms and matched firms before and after the listing date (pseudo) over the full 
sample period. The results of the DiD test in the last column show the difference in the changes 
in each beta before and after the listing between the cross-listed and matched samples of firms. 
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We find that, among the three betas, only (Liqi, rm) is significantly lower after cross-listing, 
which implies that the liquidity of U.S. firms with foreign listings is much less sensitive to U.S. 
stock market returns than the liquidity of firms with no cross-listings. This result is consistent 
with the results in Table 5. Moreover, while the average (Liqi, rm) of firms before the cross-
listing is slightly higher than that of the matched sample of firms (0.975 vs. 0.881), after the 
listing, the situation with betas reverses (0.607 vs. 0.806). Therefore, the findings suggest that 
cross-listing reduces the sensitivity of firm liquidity to lagged market returns, and decreases its 
liquidity risk as well.  
 
IV. Foreign Market and Firm-level Subsample Tests 
 In this section, examine how the characteristics of foreign markets influence cross-listing 
placement and the liquidity of U.S. firms. According to the ownership dispersion hypothesis, 
trading in more overseas exchanges would provide an additional diversification, leading to more 
liquidity supply to U.S. firms during market downturns, as long as global markets do not strongly 
move in unison. Similarly, according to the liquidity provision hypothesis, more liquid markets 
and markets with larger market caps—and, therefore, larger potential investor pools—would be 
more effective sources of liquidity provision to U.S. firms through their shares listed on overseas 
exchanges. Therefore, we consider three characteristics of overseas markets: (1) the number of 
host overseas markets with cross-listings of a given U.S. firm; (2) foreign market liquidity; and 
(3) and market capitalization.22 The market liquidity is the zero-return measure proposed by 
Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999); see also Goyenko and Sarkissian (2014). It is the 
equally-weighted average proportion of zero daily returns per month across all firms in a given 
country from 1977 to 2010. The market capitalizations of foreign countries are from the World 
Development Indicators (WDI) database of the World Bank. We split our full set of observations 
into two subsamples for each foreign market characteristic at the corresponding median value 
                                                          
22 Strictly speaking, the number of foreign exchanges that a given firm’s stock is trading in is more suitable for a 
firm-specific characteristic. However, since the properties of foreign exchanges can influence the cross-listing-
liquidity relation that we examine, their number can also be important.  
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(single vs multiple host markets, and low vs high values of market liquidity and capitalization). 
Table 7 shows the estimation results, which are based on regression Model (1). We use 
the full set of control variables, the intercept, and firm fixed effects in all regressions. Columns 
(1)-(2) show the impact of cross-listing on U.S. firm liquidity when the firm is placed in only one 
overseas exchange and in multiple exchanges, respectively. In line with the economic intuition, 
we find a much stronger liquidity supply for firms listed on multiple overseas exchanges: the 
coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1 is over 60% larger in absolute value for the firms cross-listed in the 
exchanges in two or more countries than for those present on only one. Columns (3)-(4) show the 
cross-listing impact for firms traded in markets with low and high liquidity, while columns (5)-
(6) show the impact for high and low market capitalization markets. The results in Table 7 are 
aligned with our expectations: specifically, the countries with a high aggregate liquidity or larger 
financial market provide at least 50% more liquidity to U.S. firms listed on their exchanges than 
the countries with below-median values of liquidity and size. 
 Next, we examine how cross-listings impact firm liquidity sensitivity depending on firm-
specific characteristics. To this end, we focus on four characteristics: PIN, total volatility, foreign 
income, and foreign trading. We collect all firm-specific information at the end of each year and 
average over our entire sample period. We calculate the PINs using Venter and Jongh’s (2006) 
methodology. Total volatility is the standard deviation of a firm’s gross returns over the sample 
period. Foreign income is the ratio of the firm’s foreign pretax income to its total pretax income. 
Foreign trading is the ratio of the trading volume in the host markets over that in the U.S. The 
data on daily trading volume is from Compustat Global Security Daily and is very limited in time 
and across firms. For each firm, we compute the annual average trading volume (in U.S. dollars) 
in both the U.S. and host markets, and then compute their ratio. As the trading volume 
information in Compustat Global for international markets only starts in the early 1990s, our 
sample of firms with foreign trading data is much smaller than our main sample.  
We have already discussed the link between firm liquidity and volatility. Furthermore, 
Easley et al. (1996) introduce the PIN measure and link it to stock liquidity. Stocks with a high 
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PIN receive less liquidity provision and, therefore, would suffer more during a liquidity crisis. 
By listing on an overseas exchange, a firm attracts additional noise traders, which makes its 
stock more amenable for liquidity providers. Therefore, we expect more liquidity benefits for 
stocks with a high PIN. Then, Grullon, Kanatas, and Weston (2004) find that a higher firm 
visibility improves its liquidity. Since a firm’s foreign operations improve its overall visibility, 
we expect greater liquidity benefits resulting from an influx of foreign income, when U.S. firms 
cross-list on overseas exchanges. Finally, Halling et al. (2008) report sizable shifts in a firm’s 
trading volume towards foreign markets following cross-listing. We expect that U.S. firms with a 
larger proportion of overseas equity trading will have more pronounced gains in liquidity. Note 
that standard firm attributes, such as the book-to-market ratio, earnings per share, and leverage, 
are not clearly related to firm liquidity. 
Table 8 reports the results for Model (1) across the four firm characteristics subsamples 
described above. The first three subsamples are split at the median, while the foreign trading 
volume is at the 25th and 75th percentiles.23 As before, in every regression, we use the full set of 
control variables, but do not show the intercepts and firm fixed effects, as well as cluster 
standard errors by firm and month. In support of our expectation, we find a much stronger cross-
listing effect on firm liquidity among the firms with a high PIN, high volatility, and high foreign 
income; their coefficients on the interactive term, CLi,t × RUS,t-1, are larger by about 150%, 50%, 
and 60% than the corresponding estimates for the firms with low PIN, low volatility, and low 
foreign market income, respectively. The same coefficient for foreign trading tests diverges even 
more remarkably between the low- and the high-volume firms: it is positive for U.S. firms with 
weak overseas trading, but negative and significant for those with high transaction volumes 
abroad. Therefore, the findings suggest that there is a direct relation between the liquidity gains 
of U.S. firms in the domestic market and the extent of their trading on foreign exchanges.  
 
                                                          
23 The median foreign trading volume is already 14.4%; however, at the 75th percentile of the distribution, about half 
of the trading of U.S. equities occurs on U.S. exchanges, while the rest is on overseas exchanges. This facilitates the 
interpretation of the results on foreign trading volume due to the scarcity of the data. 
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V. Foreign Ownership and Firm Liquidity 
A decline in the liquidity sensitivity to lagged U.S. market returns could result from 
ownership dispersion. In view of unsynchronized funding constraints, the ownership dispersion 
channel suggests that a diffused global stock ownership of cross-listings can mitigate liquidity 
shocks that a company faces in its domestic market. In Section V.A, we examine whether or not 
the ownership structure of U.S. firms becomes more dispersed after cross-listing events. In 
Section V.B, we analyze whether a large foreign ownership of firm equity, even without cross-
listings, is still conducive to liquidity. 24 
 
A. Foreign Ownership Changes around Cross-Listing 
First, we investigate the changes in the ownership diffusion resulting from the cross-
listing of U.S. firms on overseas exchanges. To this end, we match our sample of cross-listed 
firms with firm holdings data from FactSet Ownership database (Unadjusted Fund Holdings). 
The sample period for the ownership data is from 2000 to 2013, since the pre-2000 data are very 
sparse. For each institution (mutual fund, ETF, pension fund, etc.), we categorize it as “foreign” 
when its headquarters is located outside the U.S. Then, we compute the proportion of holdings 
by foreign institutions at the end of each year. We repeat this procedure also for our matched 
sample of firms without cross-listings. 
Figure 3 shows the dynamics of foreign holdings in U.S. firms cross-listed on overseas 
exchanges and the matched U.S. firms four years before and four years after the cross-listing 
event year (year 0). The results show a large expansion in the foreign holdings of U.S. firms after 
their cross-listing. Before the listing event, the average proportion of the foreign holdings in 
these firms is around 17%. In the year of cross-listing, the ratio increases to 28% and, in the next 
three to four years, decreases only slightly and remains in the 25%-27% range. Said differently, 
                                                          
24 In the Internet Appendix, we also show that the foreign ownership of cross-listed firms substantially increases 
with an increase in the TED spread, a popular proxy of funding liquidity during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. 
The foreign ownership of matched U.S. firms does not show similar patterns. This is consistent with the net buying 
of cross-listed stocks by foreign investors when their valuation deviates from their fundamentals. 
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we find that at least a 50% increase in the foreign ownership of U.S. firms is directly associated 
with their cross-listing in foreign markets. However, we observe no sizable changes in foreign 
ownership for our firms in the matched sample. Therefore, the results in Figure 3 reveal that the 
liquidity gains for firms listed on overseas exchanges are associated with increased ownership by 
foreign investors. 
 
B. Foreign Ownership and Liquidity of Non-Cross-Listed Firms  
It is important to acknowledge that a listing on an overseas exchange is not a mandatory 
condition for a firm to be globally owned. Therefore, if foreign holdings are conducive to firm 
liquidity, we should also observe that, without cross-listings, firms differ in their ability to handle 
liquidity dry-outs depending on the degree of the diffusion of their global equity ownership. To 
this end, we collect the average foreign holding information for 5,668 U.S. firms between 2000 
and 2013 from FactSet (excluding the firms with foreign listings) and divide them into five 
quintiles, from high to low, according to the level of their foreign holdings ratios. We find that 
the median foreign holdings ratio is 3.5%, while that for the first (highest) and fifth (lowest) 
quintiles are 14.4% and 0.0%, respectively. Then, following Hameed et al. (2010), we rerun the 
main benchmark regressions for each of these groups. To this end, we use the estimation 
specification as in Model (1), but without the foreign market return term. 
Table 9 shows the estimation results. Again, the control variables, intercept, and firm 
fixed effects are present in each regression, but their estimates are not shown. In Panel A, we 
again use the Amihud liquidity measure. Column (1) presents the full sample results. As 
previously, there is a positive and significant relation between the lagged market return and firm 
liquidity. More importantly, we also find that the firms with a high level of foreign holdings react 
less to domestic market declines: the magnitude of the coefficient on RUS,t for the firms with a 
high foreign holdings ratio (column (2)) is almost three times smaller than that for the firms with 
a low foreign holdings ratio (column (6)). In statistical terms, irrespective of the foreign holdings 
ratio quintile, all coefficients on RUS,t-1 are strongly significant. In Panel B, we use the ASPR 
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(adjusted spread) illiquidity measure from Chordia, Sarkar, and Subrahmanyam (2005). As 
expected, the firms with high foreign holdings react less to domestic market declines. 
Expectedly, for the overall results in column (1), we find a negative and significant coefficient 
on RUS,t-1, implying an increase in firm illiquidity during market downturns. However, the 
reaction of firm liquidity to poor market conditions largely depends on the foreign ownership of 
the firm. Accordingly, the results in columns (2)-(6) show that, in adverse market conditions, 
U.S. firms with high foreign holdings ratios do not experience significant illiquidity increases, 
while those in the two lowest foreign holdings ratio quintiles do (columns (5)-(6)). 
The results in Table 9 are not surprising, since the firms with high levels of foreign 
ownership are also generally more liquid (see Kacperczyk, Sundaresan, and Wang (2018)). 
However, the most important implication of the results in Table 9 is that foreign ownership is 
critical for boosting the liquidity of U.S. firms, both cross-listed and non-cross-listed. Therefore, 
any corporate action that increases the firm’s foreign holdings ratio, such as a cross-listing, has a 
positive impact on the firm’s liquidity.  
 
VI. Liquidity Provision and Return Reversals 
 In previous sections, we have shown that cross-listed U.S. firms maintain their liquidity 
in adverse home market conditions. However, it remains unclear how the enhanced firm liquidity 
affects its return dynamics. Yet, a decline in the liquidity sensitivity to lagged U.S. market 
returns could also result from direct liquidity provision. The liquidity provision channel suggests 
that foreign investors may take advantage of arbitrage opportunities by buying U.S. equities 
when their valuation deviates from fundamentals. In this relation, due to the liquidity provision 
from foreign buyers, cross-listed firms should suffer less from transitory price shocks. That is, 
the change in temporary price deviations for cross-listed firms should be greater than that for 
their counterparts listed only domestically relative to their respective pre-listing periods (pre-
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pseudo-listing period for U.S.-only listed firms).25  
Following Lehmann (1990), Lo and MacKinlay (1990), and Nagel (2012), we address 
this issue by applying the liquidity provision strategy framework. It specifies the portfolio weight 
for stock i at time t as follows: 
 st,mst,iN
i
st,mst,it,i RR|RR|/w 

 

  
1
21 ,                  (4) 
where Rm,t-s is the s-period lagged daily equally-weighted market index return, Ri,t-s is the s-period 
lagged daily gross return of firm i, and N is the total number of stocks in the portfolio. In effect, 
Ri,t-s – Rm,t-s is the difference between the firm’s return and the market index return at some lag s. 
The portfolio return at time t for the liquidity provision trading strategy is calculated as: 
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Then we compute the weekly portfolio returns for s = 1, 2…, 5 over the sample period as:  



5
1s
t,st .                     (6) 
Table 10 shows the estimation results for return reversals, including the mean, , 
standard deviation, , and autocorrelation,  of aggregated portfolio returns, t, before and after 
the cross-listing. The last two columns of Table 10 provide the results of computing the 
difference in mean returns, Before – After. Panel A reports the weekly portfolio returns for the 
cross-listed and matched firm samples before and after the (pseudo) listing. The estimates are 
return reversals for the cross-listed and matched firms over the full sample period as well as the 
NBER-defined recessions and expansions. The means of the weekly return reversals before the 
                                                          
25 Indeed, cross-listed firms may have weaker return reversals for many reasons other than their presence in overseas 
markets (e.g., relatively larger size). In this context, it is crucial to estimate the return reaction from liquidity 
provision before and after the cross-listing event. 
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listing for the cross-listed and the matched samples of firms are very close, 0.751% and 0.714%, 
respectively. This demonstrates that both firm samples behave similarly even with respect to a 
characteristic that is not used in the construction of the matched sample. After the (pseudo) 
listing, the means of the cross-listed and the matched samples of firms are 0.406% and 0.615%, 
respectively. While the return averages are statistically smaller after the listing for both firm 
samples, the reduction in the weekly return reversal magnitude is markedly higher for cross-
listed firms. In economic terms, cross-listed firms achieve a 3.5-fold larger reduction in 
temporary return deviations than similar firms without listings on overseas exchanges. Note that 
the cross-sample decrease in the severity of return reversals after cross-listing may be driven by 
the increase in market integration over recent decades. 
Furthermore, our results for the NBER-defined business cycles reveal two important 
patterns. First, the return reversal is larger during U.S. recessions. This pattern is intuitive, as 
stock prices more frequently deviate from their fundamental values in bad times. Second, the 
DiD results show a much larger reduction in return reversals for cross-listed firms than those 
listed only on U.S. exchanges during recessions. This implies that return reversals are related to 
funding liquidity, which improves for the cross-listed stocks, particularly when such 
improvement is most needed. Therefore, when liquidity provision is low in the U.S., the liquidity 
provided through international investors functions well. 
Panel B of Table 10 consists of six sub-panels and reports the weekly portfolio returns for 
the sample of cross-listed firms, categorized by three foreign market-level (number of foreign 
listing markets, foreign market liquidity, and foreign market capitalization) and three firm-level 
characteristics (PIN, volatility, and foreign income). The two rows in each sub-panel report the 
portfolio returns of the two firm subsamples based on the median split of the corresponding firm 
characteristic. The first three sub-panels (B.1 to B.3) show portfolio returns grouped by the 
number of markets for firm listings, market liquidity, and market capitalization. We see that, 
after the listing for all subsamples of foreign markets, the average return reversal is often 
reduced, both economically and statistically, by over 50%. The last three sub-panels of Panel B 
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(B.4 to B.6) show portfolio returns grouped by PIN, total volatility, and foreign income. The 
results show that the mean return reversal difference, Before – After, is statistically zero for firms 
with low volatility and low foreign income, while it is only marginally significant for low-PIN 
firms. Conversely, firms with a high PIN, volatility, and foreign income exhibit much bigger 
drops in the weekly return reversals after the cross-listing than before it. In economic terms, 
these reductions amount to 16% (0.145/0.930), 13% (0.120/0.918), and 40% (0.278/0.701), 
respectively, of the original return reversal magnitudes.  
Taken together, the results in Table 10 illustrate that, due to a higher liquidity provision, 
cross-listings yield sizable benefits to the stock returns of U.S. firms with their shares trading on 
overseas exchanges. The impact of transitory price shocks to firms with cross-listings is not as 
severe as for the firms with no listings on overseas exchanges. The cross-sectional patterns 
demonstrate that the cross-listing benefits across market and firm characteristics are similar to 
those for the impact of cross-listing on liquidity shown in Tables 3, 7, and 8. 
 
VII. Conclusions 
In this paper, we examine the impact of international markets on firms’ liquidity risk 
using a sample of U.S. firms cross-listed on 20 overseas exchanges between 1901 and 2012 and 
with stock return and liquidity data from 1950 to 2013. This framework offers at least two 
advantages. First, a cross-listing event provides a unique positive shock to the foreign ownership 
ratio after a firm lists its shares on an overseas exchange. The more dispersed ownership 
structure could provide diversification to mitigate liquidity risks. Second, working with the U.S. 
firms enables us to examine the liquidity dynamics with comprehensive data on stock returns and 
liquidity.  
We find that the presence of firm shares on overseas exchanges decreases the sensitivity 
of firm liquidity to lagged U.S. market returns. This result suggests that cross-listings improve 
firm liquidity during U.S. market downturns (i.e., when liquidity enhancement is needed the 
most). Indeed, the improvement in liquidity is larger during market downturns in the U.S. 
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determined by high levels of equity market volatility, TED spread, and the VIX index. 
Furthermore, we also find that the positive influence of cross-listings on firm liquidity is more 
pronounced when U.S. firms are listed on multiple overseas exchanges, in markets with high 
capitalization and high aggregate liquidity. Furthermore, firms with high levels of volatility, 
foreign income, foreign trading volume, and probability of informed trading also receive 
liquidity benefits from foreign listings. The results of our analysis of liquidity betas show that the 
sensitivity of firm liquidity to aggregate U.S. market returns is significantly lower among cross-
listed firms than among comparable firms with no presence on overseas exchanges. We also find 
that, due to the lower liquidity sensitivity of cross-listed U.S. firms, transitory shocks have a 
smaller effect on their returns than on those of non-cross-listed firms.  
The observed reduction in firm liquidity sensitivity to past U.S. returns coincides with a 
significant increase in the foreign ownership of U.S. firms at the time of cross-listing. The 
findings suggest that international investors act as net liquidity suppliers through two possible 
channels: (1) ownership dispersion, which leads to a non-synchronous demand for liquidating the 
same stocks across countries due to different funding constraints, and (2) liquidity provision, 
which implies the involvement of foreign investors who trade U.S. stocks when, due to the lack 
of funding liquidity in the U.S. market, prices significantly deviate from their fundamental 
values. We rule out an alternative explanation that the drop in firm liquidity sensitivity upon 
cross-listing is due to an increase in firm size. Therefore, taken together, our findings provide 
strong evidence that international markets can offer liquidity provision and risk sharing under 
certain conditions. 
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Table 1 
Distribution of U.S. firms cross-listed abroad 
 
Country  <1950 1950-59 1960-69 1970-79 1980-89 1990-99 2000-12 Total 
Australia 0 0 0 0 1 6 4 11 
Austria 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 3 
Belgium 0 17 7 5 3 3 0 35 
Brazil 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Canada 0 1 1 4 5 11 41 63 
Chile 0 0 0 0 0 0 16 16 
France 0 4 13 7 14 5 6 49 
Germany 0 0 0 1 4 36 1 42 
Hong Kong 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Israel 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 6 
Japan 0 0 0 11 65 3 1 80 
Luxembourg 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Mexico 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Netherlands 21 18 8 1 21 4 4 77 
Norway 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 2 
Peru 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Romania 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 
Sweden 0 0 0 0 1 5 1 7 
Switzerland 4 9 10 20 20 5 2 70 
United Kingdom 2 0 11 30 46 9 5 103 
Total 27 49 50 80 180 92 92 570 
This table provides the distribution of U.S. firms cross-listed aboard from 1901 to 2012 inclusive across countries 
and time. The cross-listing data come from several sources: the Sarkissian and Schill public foreign listing database, 
listing information from the major stock exchanges of each country, and CRSP. 
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Table 2 
Descriptive statistics of U.S. firms cross-listed abroad  
 
Mean Standard Deviation Observations 
Return Turnover Liq Return Turnover Liq Return Turnover Liq 
Australia 0.193 1.089 5.446 0.523 3.287 2.695 34,024 33,211 29,966 
Austria 0.275 0.318 1.146 0.662 0.718 2.195 5,071 5,071 4,227 
Belgium 0.135 0.318 6.782 0.314 0.516 2.800 85,207 85,207 79,262 
Brazil 0.375 0.226 -1.348 1.039 0.538 2.073 1,469 1,469 949 
Canada 0.200 0.547 4.394 0.537 1.154 3.369 239,542 234,410 197,372 
Chile 0.238 0.964 8.882 0.358 2.231 3.434 15,898 15,898 15,055 
France 0.179 0.425 6.236 0.366 1.376 3.190 169,916 163,125 143,921 
Germany 0.153 0.468 4.960 0.470 1.250 2.604 51,573 51,573 47,723 
Hong Kong 0.341 1.244 8.879 0.438 0.909 1.643 3,328 3,328 3,299 
Israel  0.255 0.675 3.612 0.622 1.264 3.532 22,101 22,101 20,099 
Japan 0.155 0.332 6.196 0.305 0.979 2.671 305,915 299,294 269,731 
Netherlands 0.143 0.330 6.716 0.304 0.665 2.719 642,784 642,133 583,657 
Norway 0.188 0.953 5.905 0.550 1.376 2.449 9,853 9,853 9,173 
Sweden 0.119 0.817 4.341 0.552 4.590 2.929 20,625 20,625 18,366 
Switzerland 0.147 0.429 6.622 0.336 0.764 2.638 276,189 273,708 251,915 
United Kingdom 0.165 0.376 5.828 0.350 0.644 2.727 493,059 481,225 434,034 
Total 0.161 0.409 6.101 0.370 1.059 2.942 2,376,554 2,342,231 2,108,749
This table reports the summary statistics of return and liquidity characteristics for U.S. firms cross-listed abroad. The 
sample period is 1950-2013. Only the markets of the first U.S. firm cross-listings are considered. All the stock 
returns and liquidity measures are computed from CRSP daily stock dataset. Return is the annualized daily holding 
period return including dividends. Turnover is the percentage of the daily trading volume out of the total shares 
outstanding. Liq is the Amihud (2002) liquidity measure  computed as –log((10
6 × | rt |)/(PRCt × Volt), where PRCt is 
the closing price of the stock, || tr  is the absolute value of stock return, and Volt is the trading volume at time t. All 
variables are winsorized at 1% and 99%.   
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Table 3 
Liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms before and after cross-listing  
 
Panel A: General U.S. market conditions   
  Full sample  Sub-periods 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  1950-1981 1982-2013 
Ri,t-1 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.146*** 0.147*** 0.110*** 0.111***  0.093*** 0.174*** 
(11.60) (11.59) (11.71) (11.71) (19.95) (19.95)  (12.02) (9.47) 
RUS,t-1 0.142*** 0.348*** 0.245*** 0.248*** 0.110** 0.109**  0.203** 0.221*** 
(3.11) (4.02) (3.91) (3.78) (2.33) (2.30)  (2.14) (3.18) 
RIN,t-1 0.013 0.012 0.0789 0.124 0.017 0.018  0.047 0.049 
(0.44) (0.26) (0.23) (0.36) (0.71) (0.71)  (0.91) (0.14) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1  -0.264*** -0.240*** -0.239*** -0.084** -0.088**  -0.162* -0.202** 
 (3.50) (3.84) (3.79) (2.00) (2.17)  (1.83) (2.55) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1  0.068 0.023 0.025 0.003 0.004  -0.011 0.022 
 (0.16) (0.62) (0.67) (0.13) (0.17)  (0.20) (0.41) 
CLi,t  0.163 -0.013 -0.091 -0.001 -0.001  -0.131 0.094 
 (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.96) (0.91)  (0.46) (0.05) 
i,t-1   -0.099*** -0.129*** -0.131*** -0.131***  -0.098*** -0.152*** 
  (4.18) (5.31) (42.92) (42.73)  (6.41) (3.56) 
STOVi,t-1   0.019*** 0.019*** 0.015*** 0.015***  0.008*** 0.025*** 
  (5.34) (5.08) (12.23) (12.22)  (3.01) (4.17) 
US,t-1    0.083** 0.057** 0.056**  0.048* 0.012** 
   (2.33) (2.16) (2.09)  (1.89) (2.11) 
STOVUS,t-1    0.005 0.014** 0.014**  0.020*** -0.001 
   (0.77) (2.46) (2.46)  (3.47) (0.17) 
IN,t-1    0.015** 0.006* 0.006*  0.005 0.018** 
   (2.42) (1.76) (1.73)  (1.47) (1.98) 
STOVIN,t-1    -0.052 -0.070* -0.069*  -0.038 -0.048 
   (0.73) (1.77) (1.76)  (0.70) (0.48) 
Downt-1 × RUS,t-1     0.134*     
    (1.92)     
Downt-1 × CLi,t × RUS,t-1     -0.157**     
     (2.12)     
DownSt-1 × RUS,t-1      0.108*    
      (1.84)    
DownSt-1 × CLi,t × RUS,t-1      -0.091*    
      (1.84)    
DownLt-1 × RUS,t-1      0.132*    
      (1.71)    
DownLt-1 × CLi,t × RUS,t-1      -0.175**    
     (2.11)    
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 91,927 91,920 91,920 91,920 91,920 91,920  49,731 42,189 
Adj. R2 0.015 0.016 0.223 0.223 0.473 0.473  0.348 0.210 
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Table 3 (continued) 
 
Panel B: Specific U.S. market conditions 
  U.S. market volatility TED spread  VIX 
  Low  High Low  High Low  High 
Ri,t-1 0.155*** 0.139*** 0.164*** 0.129*** 0.143*** 0.146*** 
(9.11) (9.42) (7.91) (9.18) (7.31) (8.46) 
RUS,t-1 0.147 0.290*** 0.140 0.392** -0.0210 0.329** 
(1.56) (3.06) (1.14) (1.99) (0.10) (2.23) 
RIN,t-1 0.038 -0.019 0.046 -0.123 -0.035 -0.019 
(0.75) (0.40) (0.71) (0.93) (0.46) (0.21) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1 -0.184** -0.282*** -0.127 -0.377* -0.0364 -0.315** 
(2.01) (3.35) (1.08) (1.95) (0.18) (2.21) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1 0.343 0.430 -0.517 0.116 0.032 0.081 
(0.06) (0.87) (0.08) (0.84) (0.00) (0.87) 
CLi,t -0.313 0.270 0.346 -0.644 0.186 -0.107 
(0.95) (0.83) (0.82) (1.09) (0.47) (0.16) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 45,862 46,056 30,745 31,448 35,659 26,542 
Adj. R2 0.236 0.214 0.191 0.178 0.177 0.194 
This table shows the results from panel regression of the U.S. cross-listed firms’ liquidity innovation on the lagged 
firm stock return and the U.S. and international market return variables. Panel A shows the estimations for general 
U.S. market conditions. It reports aggregate tests (columns (1)-(6)) and estimations over two equal 32-year sub-
periods (columns (7)-(8)). The U.S. stock market information is from CRSP, and international stock markets data is 
from DataStream. The dependent variable, Liqi,t, is the percentage change in monthly Amihud liquidity measure 
for each individual firm i at time t. The variables Ri,t-1, RUS,t-1, and RIN,t-1 are the lagged monthly returns for firm i, 
CRSP total market index, and international markets, respectively. For each firm i, RIN,t-1 is constructed as the 
equally-weighted average of MSCI country index return for all hosting markets for its cross-listings at time t. CLi,t is 
a dummy equal to one after the initial cross-listing date by firm i and to zero before the listing. The control variables 
include the lagged changes in in firm volatility, i,t-1, its individual shares turnover,STOVi,t-1, the U.S. market 
volatility,US,t-1, the aggregate U.S. market turnover,STOVUS,t-1, as well as international market volatility, IN,t-
1, and international market turnover,STOVIN,t-1. The U.S. market volatility is the monthly standard deviation of 
CRSP total market index return. The international market volatility is the standard deviation of monthly foreign 
market returns. The aggregate U.S. market turnover is the equally-weighted share turnover of all firms listed in 
NYSE and NASDAQ. For each firm i, the aggregate international market turnover is the equally-weighted share 
turnover of all firms with the same hosting market as firm i. Panel B shows the results for different U.S. market 
volatility, TED spread and VIX. The TED spread is from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The TED spread is 
the difference between the 3-month LIBOR and the 3-month T-bill rate scaled by the LIBOR rate. The VIX is from 
CBOE and is based on the prices of S&P 100 from January 1986 to September 2003, and on the S&P 500 options 
afterwards. The sample period is 1950-2013 (1986-2013 for TED spread and VIX). The intercept and firm fixed 
effects are present in each regression, but their estimates are not shown. Regressions (5)-(6) also include the 
individual Down, DownS, and DownL dummies and their respective interactive terms with RIN,t-1, but their estimates 
are not shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm and month. The table also reports the number of 
observations and the adjusted R-squared. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 4 
Summary statistics of characteristic of U.S. firms with and without cross-listings 
 
  Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min Max 
Cross-listed Firms 
Market Capitalization 281 14.371 1.996  9.134 18.643 
Past Return 281 0.180 0.220 -0.764 1.957 
Liquidity Sensitivity Ri 281 0.395 0.383 -1.191 1.896 
Liquidity Sensitivity RUS 281 0.948 2.155 -11.098 12.466 
All Firms ex Cross-listed 
Market Capitalization 9,725 11.439 2.153 6.096 18.535 
Past Return 9,725 0.153 0.663 -0.962 7.641 
Liquidity Sensitivity Ri 9,725 0.311 0.618 -3.972 4.661 
Liquidity Sensitivity RUS 9,725 1.307 4.079 -35.801 47.909 
Matched Firms 
Market Capitalization 453 14.172 1.254  12.476 18.235 
Past Return 453 0.206 0.595 -0.623 3.166 
Liquidity Sensitivity Ri 453 0.394 0.381 -1.020 1.729 
Liquidity Sensitivity RUS 453 0.911 1.992 -11.598 10.496 
Two-sample t-test for means 
(Cross-listed – Matched) 
Market Capitalization  0.199    
  (1.49)    
Past Return  -0.026    
  (0.08)    
Liquidity Sensitivity Ri   0.001    
  (0.03)    
Liquidity Sensitivity RUS  0.037    
  (0.23)    
This table reports the summary statistics of firm characteristics for U.S. firms with cross-listings, U.S. firms without 
cross-listings, and the matched sample of non-cross-listed firms. The sample period is 1950-2013. Accounting 
information is from Compustat and the stock market information is from CRSP. The reported four firm 
characteristics of cross-listed firms are collected at the end of the year preceding the cross-listing events. The same 
firm characteristics of matched firms are collected at the end of the year preceding the pseudo cross-listing events. 
Market Capitalization is the logarithm of firms’ total dollar market value of all outstanding common shares. Past 
Return is the annual gross stock return in the year preceding the (pseudo) cross-listing events. Liquidity Sensitivity Ri 
and RUS are the estimated coefficients (sensitivities) of regressing monthly Amihud liquidity on Ri,t-1 and RUS,t-1, 
respectively. For the cross-listed and matched firms, the liquidity sensitivity estimates are based on all observations 
before the (pseudo) cross-listing events. For all other firms, the liquidity sensitivity estimates are based on all 
observations over the sample period. The sample of cross-listed firms includes only those cross-listed U.S. firms that 
have valid links between CRSP and Compustat fundamental and supplemental data. The matched sample is 
constructed by minimizing the normalized four-dimensional Euclidean distance between the sample of cross-listed 
and non-cross-listed firms based on four firm characteristics (demeaned and standardized) that are related to cross-
listing decisions. For each U.S. firm with a cross-listing, we select two control firms with the closest Euclidean 
distance to the cross-listed firm. The matched firms must be in the same sector (first digit of SIC code) as the cross-
listed firms. We allow the control firms to appear multiple times during the matching process. The lower part of the 
table shows the two-sample t-test for the equality of means for each firm characteristic between the cross-listed and 
matched samples of firms. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 5 
Liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms for cross-listed and matched non-cross-listed samples 
 
  Cross-listed Matched  DiD 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
Ri,t-1 0.167*** 0.167*** 0.147*** 0.132*** 0.132*** 0.104***  0.157*** 0.131*** 
 (11.60) (11.59) (11.71) (9.67) (9.67) (7.85)  (14.26) (12.64) 
RUS,t-1 0.142*** 0.348*** 0.248*** 0.249*** 0.298*** 0.199***  0.238*** 0.145*** 
 (3.11) (4.02) (3.78) (4.77) (4.44) (3.74)  (7.46) (5.02) 
RIN,t-1 0.013 0.012 0.124 0.011 0.024 0.027  0.024 0.027 
 (0.44) (0.26) (0.36) (0.91) (1.25) (1.09)  (1.25) (1.40) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1  -0.264*** -0.239***  -0.111 -0.075  -0.033 -0.004 
  (3.50) (3.79)  (1.62) (1.35)  (0.79) (0.11) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1  0.068 0.025  -0.044 -0.051*  -0.023 -0.030 
  (0.16) (0.67)  (1.51) (1.94)  (0.67) (0.91) 
CLi,t  0.163 -0.091  -0.174 -0.036*  -0.191 -0.115 
  (0.06) (-0.05)  (0.68) (1.81)  (0.25) (1.61) 
D × CLi,t × RUS,t-1        -0.179** -0.197*** 
        (2.20) (2.62) 
D × CLi,t × RIN,t-1        -0.026 0.029 
        (0.66) (0.08) 
Controls No No Yes No No Yes  No Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 91,927 91,920 91,920 133,320 133,320 133,320  225,240 225,240 
Adj. R2 0.015 0.016 0.223 0.003 0.003 0.091  0.012 0.205 
This table shows the results from panel regression of the U.S. cross-listed firms’ liquidity innovation on the lagged 
firm stock return and the U.S. and international market return variables for the cross-listed and matched samples of 
firms. The sample period is 1950-2013. The U.S. stock market information is from CRSP; and international stock 
markets data are from DataStream. Each firm in a matched sample is selected based on the procedure described in 
Table 4. The dependent variable, Liqi,t, is the change in monthly Amihud liquidity measure for each individual firm 
i at time t. The variables Ri,t-1, RUS,t-1, and RIN,t-1 are the lagged monthly returns for firm i, CRSP total market index, 
and international markets, respectively. For each firm i, RIN,t-1 is constructed as the equally-weighted average of 
MSCI country index return for all hosting markets for its cross-listings at time t. For each firm in the matched 
sample, RIN,t-1 is set to be identical to the corresponding cross-listed firm. The control variables are the same as in 
Table 3. CLi is a dummy variable, which equals one after firm i cross-lists and is zero otherwise. D is a dummy 
variable which equals one for cross-listed firms and zero for matched firms. DiD are the estimates of the Difference-
in-Difference (DiD) tests. Each DiD regression also includes D × RUS,t-1, D × RIN,t-1, D × Ri,t-1, and D × CLi,t,, which 
are not shown. The control variables, intercept, and firm fixed effects are present in some regressions, but their 
estimates are not shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm and month. The table also reports the number of 
observations and the adjusted R-squared. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate 
significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 6 
Liquidity betas  
 
  Cross-listed firms Matched firms  
  Before After Before After  DiDCross-listed – Matched)  
(Liqi, Liqm) Mean 0.984 0.958 1.027 1.035 -0.034 
 SD 0.609 0.424 0.608 0.454 (0.50) 
(Liqi, rm) Mean 0.975 0.607 0.881 0.806     -0.293*** 
 SD 0.666 0.373 0.537 0.518 (4.53) 
(ri, Liqm) Mean 0.543 0.618 0.672 0.772 -0.025 
 SD 0.632 0.457 0.549 0.641 (0.35) 
This table reports the means and standard deviations of the estimated liquidity betas for cross-listed U.S. firms and 
matched firms without foreign listings before and after listing (pseudo listing) date. The sample period is 1950-2013. 
The sample of cross-listed U.S. firms includes the U.S. firms with foreign listings after their initial foreign listing 
date. The matched sample of firms is as in Table 4. To be included in our sample, we also require the firms to have 
at least twelve months of return and liquidity history available. The stock market return, risk free rate, and liquidity 
information is computed from CRSP. For each firm i, we fit the following bivariate model to obtain the three 
liquidity betas:  
ttiit xy   , ),0(~ 2it N  ,  
where (yi, xi) can take the forms of (Liqi, Liqm), (Liqi, rm), and (ri, Liqm). ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ is the Amihud liquidity measure 
of firm i at month t, while Liqi is the innovation of firm i’s monthly Amihud liquidity measure, obtained from the 
estimated residuals in the univariate AR(2) model. Liqm is the innovation of monthly market aggregated Amihud 
liquidity measure obtained from the estimated residuals in the univariate AR(2) model, adjusted to account for the 
time trend in liquidity as is Pastor and Stambaugh (2003), Acharya and Pedersen (2005), and Watanabe and 
Watanabe (2008): 
ܯܥ௜,௧ିଵ
ܯܥ௜,ଵ ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ ൌ 	ߙ ൅	ߚଵ ቆ
ܯܥ௜,௧ିଵ
ܯܥ௜,ଵ ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ିଵቇ ൅ ߚଶ ቆ
ܯܥ௜,௧ିଵ
ܯܥ௜,ଵ ܮ݅ݍ௜,௧ିଶቇ ൅ ߝ௜,௧	, 
where MCi,t-1 is the total market capitalization of firm i at month t-1, and MCi,1 is the corresponding value for the 
initial month. The market aggregated Amihud liquidity measure is the equally-weighted Amihud liquidity measure 
of all firms listed on the NYSE and NASDAQ. ri and rm are the monthly excess returns of firm i and CRSP U.S. 
total market index over the one-month Treasury bill rate, respectively. The Difference-in-Difference (DiD) test in 
the last column shows the difference in changes in each beta after the listing and before the listing between cross-
listed and matched samples of firms. The corresponding absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. *** indicate 
significance at 1% level. 
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Table 7 
Liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms for different foreign market characteristics 
 
  Number of foreign markets Market liquidity  Market capitalization 
  Single  Multiple  Low  High Low  High 
Ri,t-1 0.174*** 0.086*** 0.190*** 0.111*** 0.164*** 0.082*** 
(9.79) (11.63) (8.22) (11.86) (10.51) (13.25) 
RUS,t-1 0.225** 0.261*** 0.195* 0.296*** 0.226*** 0.311*** 
(2.55) (4.07) (1.71) (3.61) (2.78) (3.97) 
RIN,t-1 0.010 0.015 -0.002 0.021 0.013 0.003 
(0.25) (0.35) (-0.03) (0.56) (0.35) (0.06) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1 -0.160 -0.262*** -0.165 -0.288*** -0.192** -0.314*** 
(1.64) (4.29) (1.21) (3.81) (2.27) (4.09) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1 0.037 0.003 0.067 -0.004 0.031 0.014 
(0.79) (0.08) (0.92) (-0.11) (0.71) (0.29) 
CLi,t -0.292 -0.481 -0.151 0.085 -0.180 -0.271 
(0.13) (0.28) (0.63) (0.37) (0.09) (0.14) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 46,446 45,474 30,381 61,539 60,192 31,728 
Adj. R2 0.214 0.536 0.235 0.228 0.218 0.535 
This table shows the results from panel regression of the U.S. cross-listed firms’ liquidity innovation on the lagged 
firm stock return and the U.S. and international market return variables for different market characteristics. The U.S. 
stock market information is from CRSP, and international stock markets data is from DataStream. The dependent 
variable, Liqi,t, is the change in monthly Amihud liquidity measure for each individual firm i at time t. The 
variables Ri,t-1, RUS,t-1 and RIN,t-1 are the lagged monthly returns for firm i, the S&P 500 index, and the international 
market returns, respectively. For each firm i, RIN,t-1 is constructed as the equally-weighted average of MSCI country 
index return for all hosting markets for its cross-listings at time t. CLi,t is a dummy equal to one after the initial 
cross-listing date of firm i and to zero for the time before the listing. The control variables are the same as in Table 
3. The market liquidity is the zero-return measure of Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999). It is the equally-
weighted average proportion of zero daily returns across all firms in a given country from 1977 to 2010 and is taken 
from Goyenko and Sarkissian (2014). The host market capitalization information is from the World Development 
Indicators (WDI) database at the World Bank. The control variables, intercept and firm fixed effects are present in 
each regression, but their estimates are not shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm and month. The table 
also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, 
**, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 8 
Liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms for different firm characteristics 
 
Stock PIN  Stock volatility Foreign income  Foreign Trading 
Low  High  Low  High  Low High  Low High 
Ri,t-1 0.077*** 0.178***  0.078*** 0.159*** 0.128*** 0.173***  0.091** 0.262*** 
(13.36) (10.24)  (13.04) (10.18) (8.79) (8.52)  (3.05) (3.23) 
RUS,t-1 0.124*** 0.331***  0.215*** 0.305*** 0.218*** 0.328**  -0.021 0.535*** 
(2.91) (3.15)  (3.27) (2.97) (3.20) (2.45)  (0.22) (3.13) 
RIN,t-1 -0.006 0.028  0.032 -0.015 -0.007 0.056  0.126 -0.250* 
(0.27) (0.52)  (1.20) (0.29) (-0.18) (0.91)  (0.94) (1.78) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1 -0.121*** -0.276**  -0.195*** -0.284*** -0.196*** -0.348***  0.111 -0.511*** 
(3.13) (2.51)  (3.15) (2.65) (2.69) (2.62)  (0.45) (3.00) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1 0.013 0.034  -0.013 0.068 0.034 -0.006  -0.068 0.229 
(0.59) (0.58)  (0.44) (1.14) (0.85) (0.09)  (0.48) (1.69) 
CLi,t -0.145 0.054  -0.072 0.015 -0.288 0.404  -0.844 -0.123 
(0.97) (0.22)  (0.42) (0.06) (1.36) (1.50)  (1.34) (1.67) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Obs. 45,895 46,025  46,215 45,705 50,312 41,607  2,039 1,430 
Adj. R2 0.506 0.220  0.407 0.217 0.244 0.206  0.273 0.237 
This table shows the results from panel regression of the U.S. cross-listed firms’ liquidity innovation on the lagged 
firm stock return and the U.S. and international market return variables for different firm-level characteristics. The 
sample period is 1950-2013. The U.S. stock market information is from CRSP, and international stock markets data 
is from DataStream. The dependent variable, Liqi,t, is the change in monthly Amihud liquidity measure for each 
individual firm i at time t. The variables Ri,t-1, RUS,t-1 and RIN,t-1 are the lagged monthly returns for firm i, the S&P 500 
index, and the international market returns, respectively. For each firm i, RIN,t-1 is constructed as the equally-
weighted average of MSCI country index return for all hosting markets for its cross-listings at time t. CLi,t is a 
dummy equal to one after the initial cross-listing date of firm i and to zero for the time before the listing. The control 
variables are the same as in Table 3. The firm characteristics are: the probability of informed trading (PIN), total 
volatility, the proportion of foreign income, and the proportion of foreign trading, i.e., the ratio of the trading 
volume in host markets over that in the United States. All firm specific information is collected at the end of each 
year and averaged over the sample period. The PINs are calculated using the methodology of Venter and Jongh 
(2006). Firm volatility is the standard deviation of firm gross returns over the sample period. Foreign income is the 
proportion of the firm’s foreign pretax income out of the total pretax income. The information of daily trading 
volume is from Compustat Global Security Daily. For each firm, we compute the annual average trading volume (in 
U.S. dollars) in both the U.S. and host markets and then take their ratio. The first three firm characteristic samples 
are split at the median, while the foreign trading at the 25% and 75% percentiles. The control variables, intercept, 
and firm fixed effects are present in each regression, but their estimates are not shown. The standard errors are 
clustered by the firm and month. The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. The 
absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.  
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Table 9 
Foreign ownership and U.S. firms with no cross-listings  
 
Panel A: Changes in the Amihud liquidity measure 
   Foreign Holdings Ratio 
  All  Q1 (High)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 (Low) 
Ri,t-1  0.350***  0.316***  0.284***  0.313***  0.393***  0.569*** 
(26.21) (23.19) (22.12) (21.62) (19.33) (19.44) 
RUS,t-1  0.465***  0.344***  0.318***  0.468***  0.706***  0.916*** 
(4.97) (4.13) (4.55) (5.55) (5.58) (3.79) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 754,785 146,013 212,106 200,817 135,184 60,665 
Adj. R2 0.151 0.144 0.136 0.162 0.159 0.153 
 
Panel B: Changes in the bid-ask spread (illiquidity measure) 
   Foreign Holdings Ratio 
  All  Q1 (High)  Q2  Q3  Q4  Q5 (Low) 
Ri,t-1 -0.162*** -0.144*** -0.160*** -0.143*** -0.156*** -0.207*** 
(50.55) (15.04) (11.92) (11.61) (12.42) (12.90) 
RUS,t-1 -0.117*** -0.096 -0.062 -0.057 -0.188*** -0.363*** 
(13.29) (1.49) (1.07) (0.85) (3.28) (4.00) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 717,258 128,805 182,299 191,858 140,341 73,955 
Adj. R2 0.109 0.100 0.107 0.104 0.118 0.128 
This table shows the results from panel regression of the liquidity innovation of U.S. firms without foreign listings 
on the lagged firm stock return and the U.S. market returns for different quintiles of foreign holdings ratios. The 
sample period is 2000-2013. There are in total 5,668 firms in the sample. Panel A shows the results for changes in 
the Amihud liquidity measure. Panel B reports the results for changes in the bid-ask spread. The U.S. stock market 
information is from CRSP. The foreign holding information for U.S. firms with no foreign listings is from FactSet 
Ownership database that contains institutional holdings data. All firms are groups into quintiles based on the level of 
their average foreign holdings ratio over the sample period. In Panel A the dependent variable, Liqi,t, is the change 
in monthly Amihud liquidity measure for each individual firm i at time t. In Panel B the dependent variable is the 
ASPR (adjusted bid-ask spread) illiquidity measure from Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010). The variables 
Ri,t-1, and RUS,t-1 are the lagged monthly returns for firm i and the S&P 500 index, respectively. The control variables 
include changes in firm volatility, share turnover, and U.S. market volatility. The control variables, intercept, and 
firm fixed effects are present in each regression, but their estimates are not shown. The standard errors are clustered 
by the firm and month. The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. The absolute 
t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table 10 
Liquidity provision strategy and return reversals 
 
Panel A: Cross-listed and matched firm samples 
Before cross-listing After cross-listing   
Portfolio return (%)       Before – After t-stat 
A.1. All Periods         
Matched firms 0.714 2.928  0.039 0.615 4.454  0.038         0.099** 2.26 
Cross-listed firms 0.751 4.580 -0.024 0.406 2.649  0.004         0.345*** 8.48 
A.2. NBER Recession 
Matched firms 0.805 3.422  0.039 0.851 5.598  0.079        -0.045 0.31 
Cross-listed firms 1.076 5.393 -0.080 0.486 3.158  0.064         0.590*** 11.25 
A.3. NBER Expansion  
Matched firms 0.701 2.848  0.033 0.583 4.268 -0.012         0.118*** 2.63 
Cross-listed firms 0.700 4.437  0.039 0.395 2.569 -0.008         0.305*** 7.24 
 
Panel B: Cross-listed firm sample 
Before cross-listing After cross-listing   
Portfolio return (%)       Before – After t-stat 
B.1. Number of foreign listing markets 
Low (single) 0.789 5.886 -0.046 0.680 4.213  0.006         0.108* 1.89 
High (multiple)  0.534 3.933 -0.009 0.257 2.712  0.002         0.277*** 7.31 
B.2. Foreign market liquidity 
Low  0.799 6.714 -0.069 0.664 4.492  0.019         0.135** 2.11 
High  0.577 6.047 -0.007 0.366 2.938 -0.026         0.211*** 3.96 
B.3. Foreign market capitalization 
Low  0.881 6.627 -0.047 0.681 4.279 -0.027         0.200*** 3.19 
High  0.538 4.823 -0.036 0.256 3.469  0.113         0.282*** 5.99 
B.4. Firm PIN 
Low 0.312 4.365 -0.062 0.243 2.627 -0.001         0.070* 1.72 
High 0.930 6.820 -0.005 0.785 4.692 -0.026         0.145** 2.21 
B.5. Firm volatility 
Low 0.231 2.954 -0.049 0.235 1.765 -0.032        -0.004 0.13 
High 0.918 6.826 -0.039 0.797 4.843 -0.006         0.120* 1.81 
B.6. Firm foreign income 
Low  0.612 7.457 -0.031 0.562 4.026 -0.018         0.050 0.74 
High 0.701 5.754 -0.071 0.423 3.193 -0.017         0.278*** 5.33 
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Table 10 (continued) 
 
This table reports the weekly portfolio return from the liquidity provision strategy as in Lehman (1990), Lo and 
MacKinlay (1990), and Nagel (2012). The sample period is from 1950 to 2013. The accounting information is from 
Compustat and stock market information is from CRSP. The liquidity provision trading strategy specifies the 
portfolio weight for stock i at time t as 
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where Rm,t-s is the s-period lagged daily equally-weighted market index return, Ri,t-s is the s-period lagged daily gross 
return of firm i, and N is the total number of stocks in the portfolio. The portfolio return at time t for the liquidity 
provision trading strategy is calculated as 
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The weekly portfolio return is computed for s = 1, 2…, 5 over the sample period as  
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The mean, , standard deviation, , and autocorrelation,  of aggregated portfolio returns, t , are reported in each 
column. The Panel A shows the portfolio returns for cross-listed firms and matched firm sample. The details of the 
cross-listed and the matched sample firms are in Table 4. Panel B shows portfolio returns categorized by three 
foreign market characteristics (the number of markets for firm listings, market liquidity, and market capitalization) 
and three firm-specific characteristics (probability of informed trading, PIN, total volatility, and foreign income). All 
these variables are described in Tables 4 and 5. The first two rows of each panel reports the portfolio return of 
subsamples based on the median-split. The third row of each panel computes the difference between the means. The 
last row of each panel reports the absolute t-statistic of the two-sample t-test. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 
1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Figure 1. Liquidity sensitivity to U.S. market returns around cross-listing 
The plot shows the regression coefficient from regressing firms’ liquidity innovation on the lagged U.S. market 
return variable in the presence of lagged firm stock return and international market return (coefficient 2 on RUS,t-1 in 
specification (1) in Table 5). The coefficient is estimated five years before and five years after the cross-listing 
(pseudo-cross-listing) event for the cross-listed (matched) sample of firms. Due to a high volatility of estimates, 
each depicted coefficient in year t is the average of respective estimates over a three-year window [t-1, t, t+1]. Each 
year mark corresponds to the year beginning.  
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Figure 2. Dynamics of market size of cross-listed and matched firms around cross-listing.  
The plot shows the time-series of market capitalization (natural log) of cross-listed firms, as well as matched 
sample and placebo sample non-cross-listed firms from five years before to five years after the cross-listing month. 
The sample period is 1950-2013. The matched sample construction is discussed in Table 4. A placebo sample of 
firms is constructed as follows. First, from the matched sample of firms (a sample of U.S. firms without cross-
listings) the time series of market capitalization of each firm is computed. Then firms with a time series pattern 
similar to that of the cross-listing sample at months -60, 0, and +60 relative to the listing month are selected. The 
market capitalization data is from CRSP. 
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Figure 3. Foreign holdings ratios of cross-listed and matched firms around the listing event.  
This figure shows the dynamics of foreign holding ratios of U.S. firms cross-listed in overseas markets and the 
matched U.S. firms without foreign listings four years before and four years after the cross-listing (pseudo-cross-
listing) year (year 0). The sample period is 2000-2013. We first match our sample of cross-listed firms with the 
FactSet Ownership database that contains institutional holdings data. For each institution (mutual fund, pension 
fund, etc.), we categorize it as “foreign” if its headquarters are located outside the United States. Then, we compute 
the proportion of holdings of cross-listed by foreign institutions at the end of each year. We repeat the same 
procedure for the matched sample. 
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A.1. Sample Selection Bias  
In the present study, we have established that U.S. firms after cross-listing on foreign 
exchanges enhance firm liquidity during market downturns. Furthermore, our results also 
demonstrate that the positive impact of foreign listing is stronger in certain types of markets and 
for firms with certain characteristics. However, the decision to cross-list is endogenous, so that 
the sample of U.S. firms, which place their shares on foreign exchanges, is not random. 
Consequently, U.S. firms that decide to cross-list abroad may have unique, but unobservable 
features that simultaneously affect their decision to cross-list in foreign markets, causing 
increased global ownership and liquidity gains. Said differently, it is possible that the observed 
liquidity gains from foreign listing are biased upwards. A cross-listing is frequently associated 
with time-varying market and industry trends and changes in firms’ investment and growth 
opportunities (see Sarkissian and Schill, 2016).  
To address this possible sample selection bias, i.e. to understand whether or not our 
sample selection affects our findings, we use the Heckman two-stage model (Heckman, 1979). 
For the first stage estimation, we run a Probit model to predict the probability of U.S. cross-
listing on foreign exchanges. The dependent variable is an indicator, Ii,j,t, which is equal to one 
after firm i cross-lists in a host market j at time t, and is zero otherwise. Based on the gravity 
model in Sarkissian and Schill (2016), we include a set of macroeconomics variables, proximity 
measures, aggregate market conditions, firm level controls, and industry fixed effects as our 
explanatory variables. The macroeconomic variables include host market GDP (log) and GDP 
growth rates, as well as the logs of exports from and imports to the United States. All these 
variables are at annual frequency from the Penn World Tables. We use two static familiarity 
variables: geographic proximity and cultural proximity. Geographic proximity is the inverse of 
the logarithm of the great-circle distance between a host country and the United States. Cultural 
proximity is a dummy that equals to one if the host country has the same colonial heritage or 
language as the United States (and zero otherwise). We also include U.S. market return, host 
market return firm return, B/M ratio, and firm size as control variables. All these variables are 
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collected at the end of each year from CRSP and Compustat. International stock market data are 
from DataStream. All dynamic variables are lagged by one period.26  
Table A.1 presents the results of both Stage 1 and Stage 2 tests. Along with the point 
estimates and their absolute t-statistics, the results in Table A.3 also report the number of 
observations and pseudo R-squared for Stage 1 estimation and adjusted R-squared for Stage 2 
estimation. The results of Stage 1 estimation show that the probability of U.S. firms to be listed 
abroad increases with the proximity and size of the host market, its GDP growth, and imports to 
the United States. The cross-listing is also more likely with a higher host market return, as well 
with a larger firm size and foreign income. These results are generally consistent with the 
determinants on cross-listings found in previous studies (e.g., Pagano, Röell, and Zechner, 2002; 
Sarkissian and Schill, 2016). Probably the most surprising are the signs of the coefficients on 
firm return and B/M ratio. Their point estimates only imply that the decision of U.S. firms to be 
listed abroad is not closely tied to their pre-listing performance. Furthermore, the results of Stage 
2 show that the coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1 is still almost identical, both qualitatively and 
quantitatively, to that in column (4) of Table 3 – our main regression specification. In addition, 
the inverse Mills ratio coefficient is insignificant. Therefore, the results in Table A.3 provide 
evidence that our finding on the importance of cross-listing for U.S. firm liquidity enhancement 
to adverse market conditions is immune to potential sample-selection endogeneity issues. 
 
A.2 Regressions by Firm and Spread-Based Liquidity Measure 
Hameed, Kang and Viswanathan (2010) estimate time-series regressions of liquidity 
innovations on stock returns separately for each individual stock and use a bid-ask spread as their 
measure of illiquidity. Note that, unlike the bid-ask spread, which is available for a much shorter 
time period, the Amihud measure allows us to compute stock liquidity over our long sample 
                                                          
26 Our sample includes all cross-listed firms. In Stage 1, it is constructed by conducting a Cartesian join of each 
cross-listing i and host country j in year t. We set Ii,j,t, to unity after firm i cross-lists in a host market j at time t, and 
zero otherwise. In Stage 2, the sample size is smaller, because the inverse Mills ratio is not available for firms 
without “Firm Foreign Income”. 
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period. Therefore, in this section, we restate our main results in Table 3 using individual firm 
regressions with both Amihud and bid-ask spread liquidity measures. 
Corwin and Schultz (2012) derive an implicit bid-ask spread, the high-low spread (HLS) 
estimator, using stock prices collected over two consecutive trading days. This allows us to 
estimate the bid-ask spread without settling for a short sample period. In what follows, we briefly 
present their methodology. 
Denote Ht (Lt) the high (low) stock price on day t, Ht,t+1(Lt,t+1) the high (low) stock price 
over the two consecutive days t and t + 1. Then, the daily HLS or stock illiquidity estimator is: 
,             (A.1) 
where 
, , .      (A.2) 
We calculate the monthly averages of ILLiqi,t for each stock i from its daily values. The 
illiquidity innovation for each firm i at time t, ILLiqi,t, is the percentage change in its monthly 
HLS estimator, i.e. ILLiqi,t, = (ILLiqi,t – ILLiqi,t-1) / ILLiqi,t-1. Corwin and Schultz (2012) note 
that their HLS can be negative for some two-day periods. In these cases, they suggest changing 
negative daily values to zero. We follow their recommendation. In addition, to simplify 
comparisons with our estimations that use the Amihud liquidity measure, we multiply ∆ILLiqi,t  
by (-1) to arrive to the liquidity-equivalent innovation measure from the bid-ask spread, ∆Liqi,t .  
Thus, for each cross-listed stock, we estimate the equation separately for the pre-cross-
listing and post-cross-listing periods, 
∆ܮ݅ݍ ൌ 	ߙ ൅ ߚଵܴ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଶܴ௎ௌ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚଷܴூே,௧ିଵ ൅ ܨ݅ݎ݉_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ܯܭܶ_ܥ݋݊ݐݎ݋݈ݏ ൅ ߝ,  (A.3) 
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where ∆ܮ݅ݍ is the change in liquidity, while other variables are identical to those in Model (1). 
The results from these estimations are reported in Table A.2. For brevity, we report the 
estimates, including standard deviations, of the three main variables of equation (A.3), ܴ௜,௧ିଵ, 
ܴ௎ௌ,௧ିଵ, and ܴூே,௧ିଵ. The first three columns of the table reflect the test results based on the 
Amihud liquidity measure; the last three – on the bid-ask spread.  
Columns (1) and (4) of Table A.2 show the equally-weighted mean coefficients across all 
individual firm regressions using the pre-cross-listing subsample. Columns (2) and (5) 
correspond to these values from the post-cross-listing subsample. Columns (3) and (6) report the 
difference in the estimated coefficients between pre- and post-cross-listing subsamples and its 
statistical significance. The test results are largely consistent with our main findings in Table 3. 
The average sensitivity of stock liquidity in response to U.S. market returns (coefficient ߚଶ) 
based on Amihud liquidity is 0.217 before cross-listing but drops to 0.067 after cross-listing. 
This decline is statistically significant at the 5% level. Meanwhile, there are no significant 
changes in the other two regression coefficients. The results using the bid-ask spread are also 
similar to Table 3. Cross-listing decreases the liquidity sensitivity of U.S. firms (the coefficient 
on RUS,t-1 drops from 0.891 to 0.416). Statistically, the effect is significant at the 10% level, 
which is not surprising, since this estimator is less precise than its Amihud counterpart. 
 
A.3. Alternative Controls 
We also examine the impact of “bad controls” (Angrist and Pischke, 2009) and non-
linearity on the impact of cross-listing on firm liquidity. In our estimations, we control for the 
observable firm and country characteristics (e.g., volatility, turnover) and find that they do not 
drive away the beneficial impact of cross-listing on liquidity in weak market conditions. 
However, one may not exclude the possibility that these variables directly or indirectly depend 
on the cross-listing decision. For instance, Domowitz, Glen, and Madhavan (1998) and Halling, 
Pagano, Randl, and Zechner (2008) document big shifts in trading of shares after foreign listing 
placement. This can impact not only the firm volatility, but also the market-wide volatility and 
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turnover. As a result, controlling for such variables may introduce biases in interpreting our main 
results. Therefore, in Table A.3, we replace our control variables with the fixed effects composed 
of the interaction of firm and time fixed effects, as well as the interaction of country and time 
fixed effects. This change in the estimation specification accounts for unobserved time-varying 
factors that may influence firm liquidity. The results in column (1) of Table A.3 show that the 
coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1 and again significantly negative with the point estimate similar to 
that in Table 3. Then, in column (2), in order to control for any possible association between 
lagged stock returns and cross-listing, we add an additional term, CLi,t × Ri,t-1. This specification 
slightly reduces the magnitude of coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1, but it is still negative, large, and 
statistically significant at the 5% level. Finally, in the last two columns of Table A.3, we add the 
non-linear terms, first only the lagged squared firm and U.S. market returns, and then alongside 
with the interaction of these variables with the cross-listing dummy. The assumption underlying 
this inclusion of squared return terms is that the funding liquidity is more likely to get hit during 
bad market times characterized by large negative returns. However, controlling for non-linearity 
does not alter the economic or statistical inference of our previous estimations. 
 
A.3. Return Magnitude around Cross-Listing and Liquidity Sensitivity  
It is well known that firms experience substantial changes in returns around their cross-
listing dates (e.g., Foerster and Karolyi, 1999; Sarkissian and Schill, 2009). Therefore, we would 
like to see if the size of returns around the listing date is related to changes in liquidity 
sensitivity. We address this issue by ranking all U.S. firms based on their cumulative abnormal 
returns (CARs) around cross-listing events.  
First, following Foerster and Karolyi (1999), we compute the CARs over three periods: 
the pre-listing period (from day -100 to day -2) and the full period around listing events (from 
day -100 to day +250). The CARs are based on a U.S. market model. For each firm, the U.S. 
market model is estimated during the 150-day pre-listing period from day -250 to day -101. We 
require a minimum of 40 observations for the U.S. market model estimation. Then we split this 
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ranked sample by the median and re-run estimations based on Regression (4) from Table 3 on the 
resulting subsamples.  
The test results are shown in Table A.4. Regressions (1) and (3) correspond to the firms 
with below-median pre-listing, post-listing, and full listing period CARs, respectively; while 
Regressions (2) and (4) are for those with above-median CARs. Our results reveal that the 
coefficient of CLi,t × RUS,t-1  is consistently larger in magnitude for the subsamples with above-
median CARs. This is quite intuitive. In unreported results, we find that firms with above-
median CARs experience larger changes in their market cap, liquidity, trading volume, and 
foreign ownership upon cross-listing than their below-median counterparts. This implies that a 
superior stock performance during the listing period is associated with strong demand for it 
among global investors. As a result, the larger foreign ownership of firms with high CARs 
facilitates their ownership dispersion channel resulting in larger coefficient on CLi,t × RUS,t-1. 
 
A.4. Foreign Ownership Changes around the Crisis Period 
The liquidity provision channel implies that foreign arbitrageurs, unaffected by tighter 
U.S. funding constraints, may take the advantage of arbitrage opportunities by buying the U.S. 
equities during U.S. market downturns. This pattern resembles the trading of a market maker, 
who buys when the public sells (which tends to coincide with falling prices). Consequently, we 
explore whether foreign investors buy the U.S. cross-listed firms when the U.S. funding 
constraint tightens, i.e., when the effect of foreign holdings on firm liquidity is maximal. 
Figure A.1 summarizes foreign holdings ratio of cross-listed U.S. firms five years before 
and after the financial crisis year of 2008. Plot A in Figure A.1 shows holdings of both cross-
listed firms and the matched U.S. firms without foreign listings. It also shows the average 
annualized TED spread. In line with the intuition, there is a monotone and profound increase in 
the TED spread between 2003 and 2008, which suggests a steadily tightening funding liquidity 
conditions prior to the 2008 financial crisis. However, after 2008, the TED spread drops 
significantly, remaining below 0.5% on average in annual terms. In support of our expectation, 
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we observe that the proportion of foreign ownership of cross-listed firms also increases from 
about 12% prior to the crisis to almost 20% after it, to peak by 2009 and then decrease in 
subsequent years. By contrast, the foreign ownership of matched firms does not experience any 
increase around the crisis years: the overall change in its proportion within the eleven-year 
window is below 2%. Therefore, Plot A in Figure A.1 shows that, with an increase in market 
uncertainty and decrease in funding liquidity, holding of cross-listed firms only becomes more 
attractive to international investors.  
The next logical question to address is what types of institutions are responsible for the 
observed dynamics of foreign ownership of cross-listed stocks. Plot B of Figure A.1 shows 
foreign holdings ratios over the same 2002-2013 sample period by type of institution: closed-end 
funds, exchange traded funds, mutual funds, pension funds, annuity funds, and hedge funds. 
With regard to these results, the first observation is that, in the years before the financial crisis, 
the largest foreign institutional owners of cross-listed U.S. firms were closed-end funds and 
pension funds; however, post-crisis, such largest foreign institutional owners were pension funds 
and hedge funds. Over time, closed-end funds have very significantly lost their appetite for 
holding cross-listed securities: while, in 2003, their share of foreign ownership was about 60%, 
by 2011, it dropped below 20%. The other types of institutional owners maintained low, 
relatively more stable, or slightly increasing proportions of holdings of cross-listed U.S. stocks. 
The second and more important observation is that the foreign holdings of both pension funds 
and hedge funds experience strong run-up prior to the crisis, followed by a gradual decrease and 
levelling off over some higher level of holdings ratio. The time-series pattern of foreign holding 
ratios of these two types of institutions effectively explains the aggregate institutional ownership 
results presented in Plot A (Figure A.1). 
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Table A.1 
Sample selection bias  
 
Stage 1: Probit Regression (annual frequency) Stage 2: Main Regression 
Host GDP (Log) 2.814*** Ri,t-1 0.146*** 
(43.96)  (12.35) 
Host GDP Growth 0.112*** RUS,t-1 0.246*** 
(6.71)  (4.16) 
Export to the U.S. (Log) -0.842*** RIN,t-1 0.009 
(44.26)  (0.26) 
Import from the U.S. (Log) 0.330*** CLi,t × RUS,t-1 -0.230*** 
(20.99)  (4.52) 
Geographic Proximity (Log) 0.104*** CLi,t × RIN,t-1 0.024 
(6.68)  (0.61) 
Cultural Proximity -1.375*** CLi,t -0.008 
(58.74)  (0.28) 
US Market Return 0.000 IMR 0.095 
(0.01)  (0.79) 
Host Market Return 0.299***   
(6.61)   
Firm Return -0.181***   
(10.12)   
Firm Size 0.279***   
(63.41)   
Firm Foreign Income 0.041***   
(8.46)   
B/M  0.137***   
(10.75)   
  Controls Yes 
Industry FE Yes Firm FE Yes 
Intercept Yes Intercept Yes 
Obs. 125,037 Obs. 71,970 
Pseudo R2 0.310 Adj. R2 0.251 
This table shows the results from Heckman’s selection bias tests. The sample period is 1950-2013. Stage 1 gives 
Probit model results from regressing the cross-listing indicator on financial and economic characteristics. The 
dependent variable is an indicator, Ii,j,t, which is equal to one after firm i cross-lists in a host market j at time t, and is 
zero otherwise. All macroeconomic variables are at annual frequency from the Penn World Tables. U.S. market 
return, firm returns, B/M ratio, and firm size are collected at the end of each year from CRSP and Compustat. 
International stock market data is from DataStream. Geographic proximity is the inverse of the logarithm distance 
between a host country and the United States. Cultural proximity is a dummy equals to one if the host country has 
the same colonial heritage as the United States, and is zero otherwise. Firm size is the logarithm of market 
capitalization. Firm Foreign Income is the proportion of a firm’s income generated from non-U.S. sources. Industry 
fixed effects are constructed using one-digit SIC codes. Stage 2 gives the main regression results from Table 3 after 
including the inverse Mills ratio (IMR) from Stage 1 as an additional control variable. All other variables are defined 
as in Table 3. The table also reports the number of observations and pseudo-R2 in Stage 1 and adjusted R2 in Stage 2 
estimations. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. 
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Table A.2 
Regression by firm and spread-based liquidity measure  
 
  Amihud Liquidity High-Low Spread × (-1) 
  Before After After - Before Before After  After - Before 
Ri,t-1 Mean 0.105 0.139 -0.033 0.201 0.095  -0.106 
 SD 0.162 0.270 (1.60) 1.051 0.621  (1.34) 
RUS,t-1 Mean 0.217 0.067 -0.149** 0.891 0.416  -0.476* 
 SD 0.992 0.554 (2.01) 3.562 2.177  (1.75) 
RIN,t-1 Mean -0.038 0.008 0.047 -0.337 -0.089  0.248* 
 SD 0.604 0.375 (1.00) 1.572 1.310  (1.79) 
This table shows the average coefficients from the regression of U.S. cross-listed firms’ liquidity innovation on the 
lagged firm stock return and the U.S. and international market return variables. The sample period is 1950-2013. It 
reports the results based on the Amihud liquidity measure and the Corwin and Schultz (2012) high-low spread 
(HLS) estimator. For each cross-listed stock, we estimate equation (A.3) separately for the pre-cross-listing and 
post-cross-listing sub-periods. Then, we report the equally-weighted mean coefficients across all individual firm 
regressions. The U.S. stock market information is from CRSP, and international stock markets data is from 
DataStream. In columns (1)-(3), the dependent variable is the innovation in Amihud liquidity measure. The 
dependent variable in columns (4)-(6), is the change in the monthly HLS estimator for each individual firm i at time 
t multiplied by (-1). The daily HLS estimator is: 
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Ht (Lt) is high (low) price on day t, Ht,t+1 (Lt,t+1) is the high (low) price on days t and t+1. The monthly average HLS 
estimator for each stock is computed from its daily measure. The illiquidity innovation is the percentage change in 
the monthly illiquidity measure, that is, ILLiqi,t, = (ILLiqi,t - ILLiqi,t-1) / ILLiqi,t-1. We multiply ∆ILLiqi,t by (-1) to 
arrive to the liquidity-equivalent innovation measure of the bid-ask spread. Other variables are as in Table 3 and are 
winsorized at 1% and 99%. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, 
and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A.3 
Alternative controls  
 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Ri,t-1 0.140*** 0.178*** 0.174*** 0.170*** 
(9.89) (5.21) (5.12) (4.98) 
RUS,t-1 0.357*** 0.315*** 0.319*** 0.321*** 
(4.04) (3.50) (3.54) (3.53) 
RIN,t-1 0.033 0.029 0.030 0.032 
(0.64) (0.55) (0.57) (0.61) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1 -0.259*** -0.206*** -0.207*** -0.209*** 
(3.43) (2.63) (2.63) (2.68) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1 -0.023 -0.017 -0.017 -0.021 
(0.49) (0.37) (0.37) (0.43) 
CLi,t -0.011 -0.011 -0.011 -0.009 
(1.57) (1.45) (1.50) (1.21) 
CLi,t × Ri,t-1  -0.050 -0.049 -0.044 
  (1.41) (1.39) (1.23) 
Ri,t-12   0.065 0.134 
   (1.43) (1.41) 
RUS,t-12    0.161 
    (0.20) 
CLi,t × Ri,t-12    -0.087 
    (0.80) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-12    -0.178 
    (0.25) 
Country × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm × Time FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 91,921 91,921 91,921 91,921 
Adj. R2 0.012 0.012 0.012 0.012 
This table shows the main regression results after controlling for additional fixed effects and non-linearity. The 
sample period is 1950-2013. The U.S. stock market information is from CRSP, and international stock markets data 
is from DataStream. The dependent variable and explanatory variables are defined as in Table 3. Ri,t-12  is the squared 
term of Ri,t-1. Country × Time FE is the interaction of home country and time fixed effects. Firm × Time FE is the 
interaction of firm and time fixed effects. The time fixed effects are at the annual frequency. The intercept and fixed 
effects are present in each regression, but their estimates are not shown. The standard errors are clustered by firm 
and month. The table also reports the number of observations and the adjusted R-squared. The absolute t-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. 
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Table A.4 
Return magnitude around cross-listing and liquidity sensitivity 
 
 Pre-listing period Full listing period 
 Low CARs High CARs Low CARs High CARs 
Ri,t-1 0.131*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.132*** 
(8.13) (7.17) (8.17) (6.41) 
RUS,t-1 0.147 0.352*** 0.145* 0.357*** 
(1.56) (4.78) (1.78) (4.09) 
RIN,t-1 0.032 -0.040 -0.019 0.014 
(0.67) (-0.95) (-0.45) (0.30) 
CLi,t × RUS,t-1 -0.184** -0.302*** -0.165** -0.332*** 
(2.10) (3.14) (2.18) (3.20) 
CLi,t × RIN,t-1 0.044 0.034 0.075 0.006 
(0.73) (0.77) (1.44) (0.12) 
CLi,t -0.042 -0.015 -0.018 0.011 
(0.17) (0.07) (0.78) (0.42) 
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Intercept Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Obs. 34,744 33,921 33,906 33,425 
Adj. R2 0.223 0.242 0.236 0.230 
This table shows the results from panel regression of the U.S. cross-listed firms’ liquidity innovation on the lagged 
firm stock return and the U.S. and international market return variables depending on the magnitude of pre-listing 
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs). Columns (1) and (3) show the estimation of liquidity sensitivity for firms with 
below median CARs (Low CARs); columns (2) and (4) – for firms with above median CARs (High CARs). The 
U.S. stock market information is from CRSP, and international stock markets data is from DataStream. The 
dependent variable, Liqi,t, is the change in monthly Amihud liquidity measure for each individual firm i at time t. 
First, for each individual stock, we calculate the monthly average Amihud liquidity measure from its daily measure. 
Then we compute the liquidity innovation as percentage change in the monthly Amihud liquidity measure, i.e. (Liqi,t 
– Liqi,t-1)/|Liqi,t-1|. The variables Ri,t-1, RUS,t-1, and RIN,t-1 are the lagged monthly returns for firm i, CRSP total market 
index, and international markets, respectively. For each firm i, RIN,t-1 is constructed as the equally-weighted average 
of MSCI country index return for all hosting markets for its cross-listings at time t. CLi,t is a dummy equal to one 
after the initial cross-listing date by firm i and to zero for the time before the listing. The control variables are the 
same as in Table 3. The CARs are computed over three periods: the pre-listing period (from day -100 to day -2) and 
the full period around the listing event (from day -100 to day +250). The CARs are based on a U.S. market model. 
For each firm, the U.S. market model is estimated during the 150-day pre-listing period from day -250 to day -101. 
The standard errors are clustered by firm and month. The table also reports the number of observations and the 
adjusted R-squared. The absolute t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, **, and * indicate significance at 1%, 5%, and 
10% levels, respectively.  
 
14 
 
 
Plot A: Foreign holding ratios of cross-listed and matched firms versus the TED spread  
 
 
Plot B: Foreign holdings ratios by institution type 
 
Figure A.1. Foreign holdings ratio of cross-listed U.S. firms around the crisis period  
This figure shows the dynamics of foreign holdings ratios of cross-listed U.S. firms five years before and five years 
after 2008. Plot A shows holdings of both cross-listed firms and the matched U.S. firms without foreign listings 
(pseudo cross-listing). It also shows the average annualized TED spread. We first match our sample of cross-listed 
firms with the FactSet Ownership database that contains institutional holdings data. For each institution (mutual 
fund, ETF, pension fund, etc.), we categorize it as “foreign” if its headquarters are located outside the United States. 
Then, we compute the proportion of holdings of cross-listed by foreign institutions at the end of each year. We 
repeat the same procedure for the matched sample. Plot B shows foreign holdings ratios by the type of institution: 
CEF – closed-end funds, ETFs – exchange traded funds, MFs – mutual funds, PFs – pension funds, AFs – annuity 
funds, HFs – hedge funds. 
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